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Looking up in Scotland? Multinationalism, multiculturalism and political elites

Nasar Meer

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At a time when all the political parties of Scotland are trying to establish a persuasive vision of the nation, inquiry into where ethnic and racial minorities fit into these debates provides one understudied means of bridging literatures on multinationalism and multiculturalism. Focusing especially on the lesser known question of how elite political actors are positioning minorities within projects of nation-building, this article draws upon original empirical data in which three predominant clusters emerge. The first centres on an aspirational pluralism, in so far as political elites are less inclined – in contrast to counterparts in some other minority nations – to place ethnically determined barriers on membership of Scottish nationhood. The second concerns the competing ways in which the legacy of Scotland’s place in the British Empire is appropriated by actors of different political hues, and so assumes a multiform role. The third cluster points to potential limitations in minority claims-making and recognition, especially in terms of formal multilingualism and corporate multifaithism, something that may partly be explained by the tension between multinationalism and multiculturalism. Taken together, the article illustrates how elite political actors can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in Scotland can be meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too.

Keywords: Scotland; elites; nation; multinationalism; multiculturalism; identity; ethnicity

Introduction

In recent years, the constitutional possibilities raised by the separate (but related) debates over Scottish nationalism and Scottish independence have enjoyed a great deal of prominence, both inside and well beyond the borders of the UK. Despite the 2014 Scottish independence referendum result, which saw a majority (55%) vote in favour of staying in the UK, the nature and content of the wider constitutional settlement remains salient, and all the political parties of Scottish politics are engaged in trying to establish a persuasive vision of the nation. Where ethnic and racial minorities fit into these debates provides one understudied means of bridging literatures on multinationalism and multiculturalism. Focusing especially on the lesser known question of how elite political actors are positioning minorities within projects of nation-building, this article draws upon original empirical data in which three predominant clusters emerge. The first centres on an aspirational pluralism, in so far as political elites are less inclined – in contrast to counterparts in some other minority nations – to place ethnically determined barriers on membership of Scottish nationhood. The second concerns the competing ways in which the legacy of
Scotland’s place in the British Empire is appropriated by actors of different political hues, and so assumes a multiform role. The third cluster points to potential limitations in minority claims-making and recognition, especially in terms of formal multilingualism and corporate multifaithism, something that may partly be explained by the tension between multinationalism and multiculturalism. The article therefore begins with a discussion of what is understood as multinationalism studies and how this may be distilled into debates about multiculturalism in Scotland. It then moves to set out the rationale for, and approach to, studying political elites in Scotland, before turning to the empirical data as they are expressed in the three clusters of argumentation set out above. The article then considers how elite political actors can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in Scotland can be meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too.

Multinationalism studies

The study of multinationalism has generated a wide-ranging literature that spans both theoretical and empirical inquiry on ideal and existing political settlements (Peleg 2007). Thematically concerned with multilevel governance, constitutional devolution and federalism, what we might term multinationalism studies also foregrounds questions of identity and citizenship, and so can constitute a rich subfield of comparative politics; one that is distinct (although obviously related to) the study of territorial politics (McEwen, Swenden, and Bolleyer 2012). Typically focused on ‘states that have restructured themselves to accommodate significant sub-state nationalist movements’ (Kymlicka 2011, 282), multinationalism studies especially explores the character and self-identity of ‘nested’ nations that bear distinguishing histories and features of contemporary civil society (Miller 1995).

There are conceivably a number of important challenges to this framing. These include the extent to which ‘multinationalism’ is even the most appropriate appellation (Clayton 2000) or best analytical category (Barry 2001), and if it obscures multilevel dynamics (Hepburn 2011). Moreover, there is disagreement over how we should conceptualize the ways that collective identities are mobilized (Brubaker 2004), and more broadly how boundaries based upon something greater than territory (e.g. citizenship entitlements for ethnic diaspora) need to offer a more elaborate ethical rationale (Zapata-Barrero 2013). Some of these issues rehearse arguments found in the nationalism studies literature; others are incorporated from disputes in the citizenship studies literature.

The tension relevant for this paper concerns how multinationalism can relate to multiculturalist perspectives. The latter, although used differently across varying contexts, has more broadly been focused on the accommodation and integration of migrant and post-migrant groups typically termed ‘ethnic minorities’. To confuse matters, multiculturalism has also taken in multinational questions – for example, multiculturalist Canada focused from the outset on constitutional and land issues too. We might therefore summarize that multiculturalism can simultaneously describe:

the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally but
more controversially, by reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or religion. The latter is more controversial not only because it extends the range of the groups that have to be accommodated, but also because it tends to make larger political claims and so tends to resist having these claims reduced to those of immigrants. (Modood and Meer 2013, 113)

As a set of political positions, the tension between multinationalism and multiculturalism turns on how ‘for minority nations, the sustainability of their projects in the context of growing immigration depends on immigrants making a conscious choice to affiliate themselves with that national project’ (Kymlicka 2011, 294). Some try to overcome the tension by stating that multinational and multicultural perspectives can be mutually reinforcing, with each perspective contesting notions of monocultural nation states, and encouraging cultural minority formation, ‘linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination’ (Castles 2000, 5). Thus, several accounts understand the two approaches as co-constitutive in so far as one creates space for the other (Crick 2008, 2009); perhaps illustrated in Britain by the ways in which ‘present immigrant minorities easily fit into … the diversity of its four nations’ (Parekh 2009, 37). Yet, in a number of cases these perspectives have not come together as predicted, or have come to imply problematic hierarchies within federal settlements where established nations set the terms of inclusion for more recent ethnic minorities (Foweraker and Landman 2000). Perhaps signalling a revision of an earlier hypothesis that multinationalism and multiculturalism would come together, Kymlicka (2011) now recognizes that ‘countries with an inherited ethos of accommodation in relation to old minorities are not predestined to be inclusive of new minorities – there is no inherent tendency for the former to spill over to the latter’ (emphasis added). Indeed, he continues, in many cases we are finding that ‘practises of multinational citizenship are privileged over, and preclude, the fair inclusion of immigrants’ (Kymlicka 2011, 289).

Multiculturalism in Scotland

One possible exception to Kymlicka’s reading is the Scottish case, which, in their wide-ranging study, Hussain and Miller (2006, 31) note ‘is undoubtedly affected by the advancing and receding tides of British multiculturalism’. This has necessarily taken a distinct course because Scotland has long been described as a ‘stateless nation’, at least since the 1707 Acts of Union moved parliamentary sovereignty to Westminster. This union, however, was only ever partial in that ‘it did not take away from Scotland any of the major institutions of civic life’ (Paterson 2000, 46). It did not dissolve civil society, or the independence of the Church of Scotland, systems of law, education, or local governance. It was instead ‘an amalgamation of Parliaments … not an absorption of Scotland into England’ (Paterson 2000, 46) (cf. Pittock 2012, 13). This is perhaps why the characterization of Scotland as a ‘stateless nation’ was always more contentious than might be implied, and the existence of a significant quasi-institutional fabric in social and political life offers one answer to Luis Moreno’s (2006) quandary as to how ‘strong Scottishness seemed to combine with a weaker popular quest for achieving institutional self-government as compared with
Catalans’ mobilization in the late 1970s. In either case, through processes of legal and political devolution facilitated through the Scotland Act (1998) which re-established a Scottish parliament, ‘after almost 300 years [it] means that Scotland is no longer stateless’ (McCrone 2001, 1). From a multiculturalist perspective, the challenge this raises for our discussion is succinctly put in Mycock’s (2012, 65) conclusion: that Scottish political actors ‘will have to rearticulate a more realistic conception of post-British Scottish citizenship and nationality’, something that can address ‘the extent to which ethnicity continues to shape their own view of Scottish nationalism and national identity’.

However, as yet questions of multinationalism and multiculturalism in Scotland ‘have managed to fire past each other’ (McCrone 2002, 304). Despite this, there is a prevailing assumption that a ‘civic’ and inclusive ‘big tent’ national identity is a shared aspiration (Keating 2009). Yet it remains to be ascertained as to where ethnic and racial minorities, sometimes dubbed the ‘new Scots’, might come to rest in debates about nationalist politics, identity and contemporary nationhood more broadly. It has been argued that this may result from the comparatively smaller presence of such groups in Scotland, or that such minorities have not become politicized in a manner comparable to England (McCrone 2001, 171). Some researchers have therefore queried the inclusiveness of contemporary nationhood in Scotland (Mycock 2012). The implication being that since ‘all civic and democratic cultures are inevitably embedded into specific ethno-national and religious histories’ (Bader 2005, 169), Scotland cannot rely on the view that in promoting itself as ‘impeccably civic’ (Keating 2009, 217) it will be able to secure a future in which ethnic and racial minorities are included.

Bridging literatures on migration-related minority ‘difference’ (i.e. multiculturalism) with those concerning nationalism, and drawing upon primary research interviews with Scottish politicians from across the spectrum, this article elaborates on the ways in which ideas of a Scottish nationhood are being configured according to specific agendas of equality and non-discrimination, existing church settlements, prevailing notions of ‘civic’ participation and inclusion, and implicit norms of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ minority claims-making, among other things. Before proceeding, however, a fuller methodological rationale needs to be set out, and this is what we turn to next.

Why political elites in Scotland?

It is said that since devolution ‘a distinct Scottish political class has emerged, with its own career trajectory separate from the UK one’ (Keating and Cairney 2006, 56). Interestingly, Keating and Cairney find in their study that this does not so much mark a radical break with what has gone before, rather that ‘devolution has accelerated the trend towards professional middle class leadership’ (Keating and Cairney 2006, 56) (cf. Mitchell 2003). Leith and Soule (2012) too explore the emergence of an elite political class in Scotland. They observe, for example, that while elite political actors ‘present an inclusive sense of identity that is not predicated on any sense of birth, ethnicity or history’ (Leith and Soule 2012, 148), this contrasts with the mass
perception that conceives the ‘Scottish nation as having much firmer and more distinct boundaries in terms of membership’ (Leith and Soule 2012, 149).

The nature and extent of this possible divergence is explored further below. What is important to register here is that with the exception of these few accounts, the study of elite political actors in Scotland is relatively sparse, but is consistent with a broader tendency where social and political scientists ‘too rarely “study up”’ (Ostrander 1995, 133; cf. Bond 2007). There are important methodological reasons for this, not least obstacles centring on researcher access (Smith 2006). Yet, the notion that elites matter is commonplace within social and political studies (Uberoi and Modood 2013), and in so far as ‘their undeniable influence’ warrants consideration (Leith and Soule 2012, 122), empirical inquiry might draw on at least two rich veins of literature in democratic theory (Plamenatz 1973) and nationalism studies (Gellner 1983). While neither is a perfect fit, we might search for an idea of institutional opportunities among those typically associated with behaviourist traditions; something that flourished for a period in North American political sociology. This saw both Dahl’s (1961) Who Governs? and Wright-Mills (1956) The Power elite employ methods that focused on the behaviour of a relatively small number of actors in particular political situations. While these authors profoundly disagreed in their understanding and analyses of political systems, they had in common the view that ‘the politically active elites in a modern democracy are … only the tip of what appears in national parliaments’ (Goodwin 1987, 226). The wider body of elites in their account may be populated by ‘politics facilitating occupations’ (King, 1980 quoted in Keating and Cairney 2006, 45). These include journalists, lobbyists, barristers and financiers, among others, and are precisely some of the elites who emerge in more diffuse conceptions envisaged in nationalism studies literatures, some of which maintains that ‘cultures and politics are forged by small minorities, usually by one kind of elites or other’ (Smith 2008, 6; cf. Law 2001). Were we to assess the normative premises of such views, we would inevitably encounter a dense literature elaborating the continuing disputes over the creation of nations, national identities, and their relationship to each other and to non-rational ‘intuitive’ and ‘emotional’ pulls of ancestries and cultures, and so forth. Chief among these is whether or not ‘nations’ are social and political formations that developed in the proliferation of modern states from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards (Breuilly 2005), or whether they are tied to historical formations – or ‘core ethnies’ – bearing an older pedigree that may be obscured by a modernist focus (Smith 2008). These tensions are relevant because while the current focus is a more future-oriented one, this does mean that ‘the debris of history – a source of building materials for discretionary construction by current history making entrepreneurs’ are unimportant (Hussain and Miller 2006, 121). Indeed, we know that ‘elites in Scotland are … trying to harness an already significant level of national attachment’ (Leith and Soule 2012, 122) and we are precisely interested in the ways in which some political elites are imagining Scottish nationhood vis-à-vis ethnic and racial minorities. Here, Leith and Soule (2012, 121–122) make the observation that political elites in Scotland ‘invite the masses into history’ (Nairn 1997, 340; quoted in Leith and Soule 2012, 121), and do so in a language that connects elite and mass ideas of what the ‘nation’ is. ‘In contemporary Scotland’, they continue, ‘everyday politics is a
situation of contending elites who seek to construct a specific sense of national identity’ (Leith and Soule 2012, 121–122).

We should be cautious, however, lest we assume that national identities in Scotland are able to be marshalled in a purely party political fashion. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) have repeatedly established that there is no linear relationship (running in either direction) between self-identification as Scottish and an aspiration for greater national self-determination (either in terms of constitutional arrangements for greater devolution or indeed independence). Hence if ‘one does the survey equivalent of hitting people over the head with a blunt instrument and forces them to choose just one national identity’ (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009, 9), we encounter only a ‘weak’ association between national identity and devolution, a tendency that remains true of those deemed ‘exclusive Scots’ (who self-define as Scottish and not British) since only 27% of whom support the Scottish National Party (SNP). These findings are reiterated in Bond and Rosie’s (2010) conclusion that although the prioritizations of one or other national identity can be related to likely electoral choices, the tendency is one of ‘non-alignment’ (Bond and Rosie 2010, 96).

We might further add that since the SNP has been in power with an unexpected overall parliamentary majority following the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary election, the appeal of full independence has not prevailed. Of course this was no longer a theoretical question. The SNP’s victory allowed them to honour their manifesto pledge to negotiate with Westminster to hold an independence referendum. This took place on 18 September 2014 and showed that electoral support (expressed in voting patterns) for the SNP was not matched by support for the constitutional independence of Scotland. With an electoral turn out of nearly 85% (the highest in any election in the UK since the 1950s), over 55% voted against independence. While post-referendum analyses are still being undertaken, the Lord Ashcroft opinion poll carried out on 18–19 September is a useful indicator of preferences. What is especially relevant for our discussion is that with a sample of over 2,000 respondents, we learned that 20% of SNP supporters were unlikely to vote for independence. This reiterates why we should avoid the category error of trying either to equate Scottish nationalism with – or principally understand it through – the premier nationalist party. Moreover, the campaign in favour of independence has had the support of another party represented in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Greens, as well as all of the independent members (the late Margo MacDonald, Jean Urquhart, John Finnie and Bill Walker). 6

While this is not to deny that ‘nationalists are [most] successful when they capture the “nation” for their own political project’ (McCrone 2001, 177), in the case of Scotland it does not need to be about independence alone. It is precisely because political elites of all hues are reaching for some ownership of nationalism in Scotland that makes the topic especially interesting (the unionist parties in Scotland are thus named Scottish Labour, Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Liberal Democrats, etc.). The tendency, of course, is to assume that the separatists are the only nationalists, and Leith (2010, 294) offers an interesting survey of how both nationalist and unionist party political documents appropriate the nation and configure Scottishness to their respective policy projects. This returns us to the role of elites as ‘individuals who provide the intellectual element of the governing group within a given society’ (Leith
and Soule 2012, 121). Perhaps the simplest way of putting this for our task is to ask: ‘Who owns “Scottish nationalism”?‘ (Hassan 2009, 9). This question is in many respects at the heart of this exploratory article, which considers where ethnic and racial minorities, the ‘new Scots’, might come to rest in Scottish nationalist politics, identity and nationhood.

To this end, the next sections outline three political themes that emerge from the interview data with Scottish MSPs. In total, twenty-one interviews were undertaken with members of the Scottish Parliament (out of a possible 129 members), between March and November 2012 in their parliamentary offices in Holyrood. The research was supported by the British Academy and then the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and a gender balance was sought and achieved for the two parties with the largest number of parliamentarians (see Table 1): four males and four females each for the SNP and Scottish Labour, out of a total number of sixty-five and thirty-seven, respectively. This was less successful with the two Conservative respondents (two male out of a possible fifteen), two male Liberal Democrat respondents (out of a possible five) and one Green respondent (out of a possible two) (here the gender of the interviewee is not cited as it would easily identify the respondent since there is one male and one female Scottish Green Party representative in the Scottish Parliament).

As a sample, the number of interviewees are just short of a fifth and an additional set of interviews (eleven in total) were conducted with journalists, civil society actors and intellectuals deemed to be in ‘politics facilitating occupations’ (King 1980 quoted in Keating and Cairney 2006, 45). The latter were especially instructive during the early stages of the research, and the discussion here is principally focused on the parliamentary elites who remain understudied in the literature on minorities and nationhood in Scotland. It is important to bear in mind that these are not intended to be a statistically representative number but instead a meaningful inclusion of people who have featured in debates about and/or are relevant to the topic more broadly (Table 2).

Each participant was recruited through an invitation letter offering full disclosure about the focus of the research, and each interview took the form of a qualitative semi-structured discussion. An iterative coding frame was devised from preliminary research comprising secondary analysis and scoping interviews (for a full breakdown of the coding, see Meer 2013). While the thematic focus was on ethnicity and contemporary national identity, based on scoping materials it was decided that a

<table>
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<th>Political party</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Conservative Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Green Party</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
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fruitful manner of approaching this was directly through a focus on past-, present- and future-oriented questions concerning unity and diversity under multinational and multicultural conditions (see below). This was analysed with ATLAS.ti. Confidentiality was assured and the interviews were recorded, transcribed and returned to interviewees for further comments.

An aspirational pluralism

The historian Tom Devine has proposed that we can understand the incremental self-confidence expressed by political elites in Scotland as an ‘aspirational nationalism’ (quoted in Goursoyanni 2012, 63). This he allies to a broader social transformation and cultural renaissance that has accompanied both devolution and the shift to a service-based economy. A key question for our discussion is whether this also includes an aspiration for pluralism. Here, there is evidence of a consensus across unionists and nationalists that a project of diverse nation-building is under way. Below are four expressions of this, two from unionist (Scottish Labour and Scottish Liberal Democrats) and two from nationalist (SNP and Scottish Greens) parliamentarians. Twin frames are especially evident. The first gains purchase from Scotland’s historical multinational diversity and is expressed in the following two quotations:

If you’re in Scotland, or you’re in Wales, you know, it’s abundantly clear. Because you’re in a small part of Britain, the smaller nations within Britain, it’s very clear that Britain is a union of nations. It’s inherently a multinational, multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural entity. It can’t be anything else. (Scottish Green Party MSP [H1])

If you read down through Scotland’s history we have a fairly, I think, proud tradition of assimilating waves of different groups in a way that has sustained a population in many communities. And I think that’s led to a far more diverse and vibrant and interesting cultural mix than when people were, perhaps, a little more static in the communities and regions of their birth. (Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP [M1])

The second frame is more active in so far as Scottish nationalism, it is claimed by both nationalist and unionist political elites, has been cast in an inclusive mould, not least by these MSPs’ respective parties:

I suppose, without patting ourselves on the back too much, this is to the credit of the Scottish parliament. And, I mean, I say Labour and SNP, I’m not actually saying that the

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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Journalist</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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Table 2. ‘Politics facilitator’ interviewees.
other parties have dissented from this, but they dominate Scottish politics to such an extent that it’s what they do that’s been decisive in these areas. So, you know, that probably sounds a bit complacent, but I do think that we’ve had a more positive record than, you know, both Labour and Conservative in England. (Scottish Labour Party MSP [T1])

So, we’ve captured nationalism and made it something positive, and made it civic, so that’s been, you know, eight decades worth of work. It doesn’t happen overnight. … If you don’t have this alternative nationalism, national movement, national political party that a nationalist might be civic, then the EDLs of the world, and the BNPs and the National Fronts, they fill that void …. (SNP MSP [E1])

Each of the testimonies illustrates the nebulous ways in which elite political actors understand the function of nationhood. Beginning with the first tendency, to place Scotland’s diversity within a historical register of multinationalism is to argue that this has served as a sort of prophylactic against exclusivity, or at least facilitated an inclusive vision. This is a hypothesis that can be partially tested. Surveying the attitudes of Scottish majorities to claims-making by minorities on nationhood in Scotland, McCrone and Bechhofer (2010, 922, 937) point to a small but consistent ‘ethnic penalty’ that reveals itself marginally more in Scotland than in England, such that “Scottish” is possibly more likely to equate to “being white”. As they discuss, residence in Scotland is deemed a weak claim on national identity, but when markers such as accent are added, ‘between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of people accept the claim, but introducing parentage, which implies a blood link, produces a further big increase in acceptance’ (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010, 937). What should we make of this? It certainly challenges the prevalent view among political elites that ‘there’s not a sort of idea amongst Scottish people that you have to be white and, you know, in order to be Scottish’ (Conservative MSP [P2]).

While the marginally higher rejection rates towards non-white in Scotland compared with England is concerning, the authors argue that it is important not to exceptionalize Scottish attitudes, for although they are slightly more exclusionary than English attitudes, they are not radically so. Interestingly, in their follow-up study, Bechhofer and McCrone (2012, 1364) found a closer pattern between England and Scotland when they looked to see whether national identity ‘discriminates in terms of judging claims’, something statistically affected by levels of education and/or age. Either way, these findings need to be understood alongside ways in which minorities in Scotland are more likely than their counterparts in England to appropriate hyphenated self-defined identity categories (e.g. Scottish-Pakistani). This is a well-established trend that political elites sometimes bring in to support their view that Scottishness is an open identity. One respondent describes this in the following terms:

there’s something in that Scottishness, and a separate Scottish identity, or nationalism [that] is not about choosing one identity over the other, and maybe identity can be multi-layered, can be fluid, and can exist cohesively, rather than be juxtaposed, and constantly in conflict with one another. (SNP MSP [A1])

As a trend in self-identification this is something identified over a decade ago with Scottish-Pakistanis in research by Qureshi and Moores (1999, 327) and Saeed, Blain,
and Forbes (1999, 839). Our understanding of this was profoundly deepened in Hussain and Miller’s (2006, 168) findings. The latter observe that ‘because spatial [territorial] identities are not the primary identities for a majority of [Scottish] Pakistanis; they find it easier to adopt a Scottish identity’. Other smaller-scale studies open up lines of inquiry that broadly show continuities in this trajectory, alongside new findings (Qureshi 2006; Hopkins 2009; Bonino 2013). This is partly why McCrone and Bechhofer (2010, 926) have argued that ‘being Scottish may be thought of as an inclusive club with a low entry tariff’, a kind of ““Big tent” Scottishness’ where ‘everyone living in the country has a claim’. The important aspect here is the subjective confidence and willingness among minorities to stake such a claim.

What, however, of the second view that political elites have actively steered Scottish nationhood in a more inclusive direction, what Reicher and Hopkins (2001, 92) quote one SNP Member of Parliament as naming ‘a tartan in which so many different, brightly coloured parts of the whole merge together as a pattern’. We might here point to political speeches – for example, the former First Minister Alex Salmond has previously stated, and subsequently reinforced, that ‘Scotland is not Quebec … the linguistic and ethnic basis [of Quebec] nationalism is a two-edged sword … we [in Scotland] follow that path of civic nationalism’ (Salmond 1995, quoted in Brubaker 2004). Or we might highlight policy phraseology that refers not to ‘Scottish people’ but to ‘all the people of Scotland’ (Leith 2010, 292). Indeed, the White Paper Scotland’s Future (2013), which set out the Scottish Government’s case for independence, insists that ‘a commitment to multicultural Scotland will be a cornerstone of the nation on independence’ (Scotland’s Future, 271).

In many respects, what is most interesting is that this is a self-conscious goal among political elites, because it distinguishes Scotland from comparable autonomy-seeking nations. Of course, there is an instrumental political logic here in so far as political elites ‘have a powerful incentive to recruit immigrants to their national projects, both to disprove charges of ethnic exclusion and to build internal consensus’ (Kymlicka 2011, 294). This would seem self-evident. ‘Better in terms of realpolitik to draw the boundary around as many as possible; better to have them inside the tent than out of it if one was trying to govern the kingdom’ (McCrone 2001, 178). Yet, other nations have shown a marked inability among elite political actors to overcome this.

Here we may include the way in which the Basque Nationalist Party has until recently stipulated the requirement of four grandparents for membership of the party, or how Quebec separatist leader Pauline Marois and others have emphasized the importance of Quebecois de souche (‘old stock’). The catalonian case meanwhile has been a frequent point of comparison with Scottish nationalism (Moreno 1986, 2006), and makes a striking contrast because of the degree to which an immersion in Catalan language is a core integration objective and condition of achieving residency (within the limited space for immigration competency enjoyed by the Catalan authorities) (Arrighi de Casanova 2014, 120). While these levels of autonomy in citizenship-making processes exceed devolution in the UK, they are not radically dissimilar to the kinds of federalism found in Belgium or Canada in relation to Quebec, and each make for a contrast with the pluralistic discourse of political elites in Scotland, all of whom betray a relatively low threshold for inclusion. As one puts it:
If you live and work in Scotland, you’re a Scot, and if you want to be … You need to want to be part of it. We can’t bully people into being Scottish if they don’t want to be, you know? But that’s the wonderful thing, is that people come here, and they want to be Scottish. They want to be part of Scotland and they want to have a Scottish identity. (SNP MSP [L1])

Scottish political elites therefore express their nationalism as a ‘political’ and not ‘social’ matter, and certainly not as a matter of blood and soil. While the distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism has already been identified as problematic, it makes sense why the late Bashir Ahmed, Scotland’s first ethnic minority MSP, could confidently state: ‘[I]t isn’t important where you come from, what matters is where we are going together as a nation’ (quoted in Salmond 2009). Either way, historical experience self-evidently casts a shadow over contemporary expressions of nationality in nearly all cases, and it is to this in relation to Scotland that we now turn.

**Expeditionary proteophilia**

Scottish political elites frequently invoke experiences of Empire and, allied but also parallel to, the history of Scotland as an emigrant sending nation in their discussion of pluralism. The relevant questions for our discussion concern how these narratives are assembled and deployed. Tom Devine, for example, has complained that ‘between 1936 and 2003, there was no academic analysis of Scotland’s role in the British Empire’ (quoted in Goursoyanni 2012, 61). As a consequence, he maintains, Scottish public discourse has ‘suffered from amnesia on that’ (quoted in Goursoyanni 2012, 61). This a view shared by another prominent intellectual, who points to ‘victimhood works’ that have cultivated a ‘chip on the shoulder, you know, Scotland as victim … because the nation’s history was not really taught in schools, or at least until very recently’ (Academic [K1]).

In putting it in these terms, the respondent is making the significant point that the Scottish story, just as the British one, is ‘Bursting with Skeletons’ (Marquand 2009). Thus, throughout various cycles of British expansionism and colonial settlement, the sons and daughters of Scotland have made up its military and civilian ranks in copious numbers (Stenhouse 2004). Devine (2003, 251) has set himself the task of elaborating how in the most profitable parts of the East Indian Trading Company, roughly half of the accountants and officer cadets were Scottish. In the words of the third Earl of Rosebery, this relationship ‘Scotticised India and Orientalised Scotland’ (quoted in Devine 2003, 126). Indeed, from the middle of the nineteenth century, the British Raj system was created under a Scottish governor (General James Dalhousie), while elsewhere the Scot Charles James Napier effectively annexed the Sind province (a large part of modern Pakistan). Hence, by the mid-nineteenth century, when one in ten of the British population was Scottish, one third to a quarter of the civil service elite grade of the East India Company was Scottish. So ‘as late as 1928, the Chief of the Imperial and Indian General Staffs were both Scots’ (Pittock 2008, 9), while the hymns of war ‘Scotland the Brave’ and later ‘Flower of Scotland’ were appropriated as popular national anthems (McCrone 2001, 158).
What is especially interesting for our discussion is the tension that Mycock (2010, 351) describes over the ways in which ‘national narratives must remain largely positive and not dwell on the imperial sins of the past’. How then is Scotland’s role in the Empire, and the historical impact this has had upon various interconnected spheres, negotiated by Scottish elites? One prevailing trope is what we could describe as an *expeditionary proteophilia* – by this I mean an appetite for diversity born of searching it out over the centuries. This is demonstrated in the following two quotations from unionist and nationalist political actors, respectively:

I mean, we’ve always been an outward looking society; Scots have traditionally had no inhibitions about setting forth usually to the, kind of, wettest, windiest parts of the world. … But, again, you have a look at the example of Orkney, the Hudson Bay Company exploration, North West Passage, the Antarctic Whaling Fleet, none of those would have happened or been sustained without Orcadians very much in the mix. I think the more outward looking you are, the more prepared you are to go out and experience different cultures and societies; the more receptive probably your community is to that reverse process. (Liberal Democrat MSP [O1])

Scottish people have a recognition of their part in the British empire, and that when you have been part of an empire, and part of the Commonwealth as well, that you are part of a world society, and that you have a responsibility for history. So we don’t see people, certainly not in the biggest population which would be the Pakistani population, we don’t see them as being different to us other than, you know, they’re all part of the Commonwealth. (SNP MSP [Q1])

It is evident that each focuses on the positive inheritance of Empire, much as Mycock predicts, yet it is also intriguing to note that neither the unionist nor nationalist MSP refuses ownership of Empire. There is, moreover, a persistently ambiguous tendency for recalling Empire and de-colonization for Scottish politics, for it is something that taps into a sociological contradiction. This is captured in Hussain and Miller’s (2006, 16) study, which finds it is common to hear Scottish ethnic minorities maintain that ‘Scots understand colonialism – from their past history they understand what ethnic minorities feel’. It is reminiscent of the rationale once provided by the late Bernie Grant MP, one of the first ethnic minority candidates elected to the post-war Parliament, who insisted that he would refer to himself as British because ‘it includes other oppressed peoples, like the Welsh or the Scots. It would stick in my throat to call myself English’ (quoted in Paxman 1999, 74). Yet, the ambiguities of Empire are so multiform it can be brought in to service the argument of the SNP’s Angus Robertson MP (2010, 22), who uses a post-colonial framing in nationalist politics, arguing that

‘there was a time when Australia, Canada, Ireland, and United States were all run from London. They are all now wealthier per person than the economically centralised UK. And none of these nations would let London decide what is best for them today’

In this reading, *partners* in Empire become the *objects* of Empire.

It is a tension that has not gone unnoticed by critics who complain that ‘nationalists declare themselves victims of colonialism, conveniently forgetting how many of them
strutted around the colonies barking orders at the natives and relishing their sundowners’ (Allibhai-Brown 2002, 45). So there is certainly something in how Empire ‘complicates post-colonial dimensions of secessionist nationalist discourses’ (Mycock 2010, 350), specifically in highlighting a ‘common imperial experience’ (Mycock 2010, 350), that limits the kinds of manoeuvres that political elites are able to make.

A more persuasive position that harnesses Empire can utilize history to express a pro-immigration account:

Do we want to be part of the world? Absolutely. Is our outlook international? Yes, it should be. That’s very much, I think, Britain’s approach to these things too. Good gosh, you can’t have Britain’s history and not be that. So why have very restrictive immigration policies in that, particularly in that kind of area? (Scottish Liberal Democrat [R1])

In different ways, then, both readings are competing to select ‘from all that has gone before that which is distinctive, “truly ours”, and thereby to mark out a unique, shared destiny’ (Smith 1998, 43). While this is in part a historical activity, it has observable contemporary implications, and it is to this that we now turn.

**Boundaries for integration**

Kymlicka (2011, 284) has argued that multinational settlements can be ‘provisional’ in their accommodation of ethnic minority claims, suggesting that there is often a dissonance between the reasonable aspiration of minorities and the degree of willing accommodation by states. There is a tangible expression of this tension in Scotland. Political elites frequently point to a number of boundaries for ensuring integration and pursuing unity. Two examples include the question of multilingualism and multi-faithism. Taking the issue of language first, the national languages of Scotland include Scottish Gaelic, of which there are approximately 60,000 speakers (UNESCO 2010) and which has seen important advances in its recognition. This includes the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005, which created the Bòrd na Gàidhlig, a body charged with ‘securing the status of the Gaelic language as an official language of Scotland commanding equal respect to the English language’. Among other rationales put forward is that ‘Gaelic is … an element of Scottishness because it’s not spoken anywhere else’ (Academic [U1]). Despite this recognition, it is clear that in contrast to other nations, ‘the language tariff which people have to pay to be “Scots” has been low to the point of non existent’ (McCrone 2001, 177), and so allows Scottish nationalism to be more than ‘protecting a cultural past under threat’ (McCrone 2001, 177, 50; cf. Bechhofer and McCrone 2014b). Yet when the question is raised of bringing other languages into the fold, which are more frequently spoken and appear to be taking on distinctive Scottish forms in terms of content and dialect, there is some consensus among respondents that Scottish Urdu and Scottish Punjabi could not warrant a status as one of Scotland’s national languages. A typical summation, is put forward by a Conservative MSP:
Gaelic has a privileged position because of the heritage and the desire to preserve the culture and the language so it’s always going to get special treatment. As far as the rest is concerned I, by and large, think that we should be looking to integrate. Let’s not get into this situation where there are sectioned-off communities who can’t communicate with people out with their own immediate society, I think that’s very dangerous. (Conservative MSP [V1])

In this assessment, historical multilingualism is a feature of the national identity whereas migrant languages are potentially, but not necessarily, fragmentary. This does not need to be illustrated further as there was a consistency (though softer language was used by other respondents). Whether or not political elites favoured or opposed the recognition of Gaelic (some respondents argued it was a and not the national language), in the view that recognizing further languages could be divisive. Of course this is precisely what some authors argue will leave minorities feeling ‘left out [when] the majority understand the polity as an expression of their nation, or agreed purpose, whatever it may be’ (Taylor 2001, 123).

A more charged illustration, however, concerns the prospects for religious pluralism, especially corporate recognition, anything up to how ‘the Irish Catholics secured various gains as part of a settlement’ (Academic [U1]). The settlement being referred to emerges through a period of Catholic emancipation in Scotland, most clearly symbolized by the restoration in 1878 of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Scotland (McCrone 2001). A synopsis of responses are quoted here, which centres on the issue of parity for the state funding of faith schools for minority religions in addition to Protestant and Catholic groups:

That’s a bit of a controversial topic actually. I personally don’t think it’s a great thing. … I just don’t think they’re particularly helpful in this day and age. (SNP MSP [A1])

I think the scars of the, kind of, sectarian divide we’ve had are there and probably more of the focus of attention in terms of things that we need to resolve. (Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP [R1])

I think it would be extremely depressing to think that in 50 or 60 years’ time, Muslims were no more integrated than that. There remain serious problems in terms of sectarianism and attitudes and prejudices against the Catholic community and between the Catholic community and what you might call Protestants but if we repeated those mistakes in terms of other ethnic groups and other religions, I think that would be very depressing. (Scottish Green Party [H1])

But I’m not keen on that, you know … I still don’t like too much separation because I think you need to respect each other while talking to each other and being engaged with each other, so I suppose in that sense I’m not really an enthusiast for Catholic schools, but yet I’m not going to stand up and try and abolish them because…. (Scottish Labour Party [U1])

There are some very good reasons to be cautious about seeking to mirror one religion settlement in the present with something from the past (Meer 2009), and it must be stressed that all respondents were positive (often very positive) about the fact of religion pluralism in Scotland. What is interesting in these responses, however, is how each frames the question of formally recognizing religious pluralism – as opposed to
the fact of religious pluralism at large – within a register of sectarianism. There is a lively debate over the form and scale of sectarianism in Scotland (Raab and Holligan 2012), but in most instances this has centred on enmity and discrimination between Scottish Protestants and Scottish Catholics, something that has given rise to recent government initiatives through legislation such as the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. This Act is especially interesting because although it makes a special mention of religious discrimination, it offers equivalent protection on the grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability. It is one illustration of how approaches to race equality in Scotland both directly reflect the British story (as it was expressed in devolved settlements, for example, Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c46) incorporated part of the 1976 Race Relations Act), but may be traced to a distinctively Scottish experience, not least in terms of tackling religious bigotry and incitement to religious hatred (Meer 2014).

Despite innovations such as this, it remains the case that how newer religious minorities are being asked to integrate into existing configurations reproduces certain hierarchies, something recognized by Hussain and Miller’s (2006, 32) observation that ‘faith-based schooling has many critics, but they [critics] are at once reluctant to dismantle the existing system of Catholic schools yet reluctant to set up a system of Muslim schools’. The clear danger for newer religious minority claims-making is that it is framed by political elites within a register of historical sectarianism, rather than according to its own dynamics. The latter would preferably occur within a ‘democratic discourse, which makes explicit the grounds on which proposals are linked to identities and hence opens up space for debate and alternatives’ (Reicher et al. 2005, 636). In many respects then, this returns us to the tension between multinationalism and multiculturalism discussed at the outset, in so far as there is a danger that the sustainability of minority national projects in conditions of ethnic diversity places the two diversities into a hierarchy that is limiting for the latter.

Conclusions: catching up with itself?

This article has considered how elite political actors are locating minorities within projects of nation-building under conditions of multinationalism and multiculturalism. Taken together, the article illustrates how elite political actors can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in Scotland can be meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too. At a time when all Scottish political parties are jockeying over a vision for the nation, the article uses original empirical data to show the emergence of three predominant clusters: an aspirational pluralism, a multiform appropriation of Empire, and potential limitations in minority claims-making and recognition.

The paper discussed the implications of the Scottish case for the relationship between multiculturalism and multinationalism in Scotland. While it is certainly the case, as Kymlicka (2011, 289) recognizes, that ‘countries with an inherited ethos of accommodation in relation to old minorities are not predestined to be inclusive of new minorities’, Scotland is not a textbook expression of this. Not only is the tension less stark than in some other cases discussed in the paper, but what is especially interesting
is that there is also a strong and unambiguous trend not only among majorities, but among ethnic minorities, in identifying themselves with the nation (either as Scottish only, or Scottish-British, or Scottish plus something else). The question that this leaves unanswered is whether this revises how Scottish identity is imagined by the majority too. The answer is not necessarily something that points to a gap between the official identity of Scotland as a nation and people’s Scottish national identities.

When authors such as Hanif Kureshi and Salman Rushdie, and politicians including Diane Abbott and Bernie Grant, tackled Britishness in the 1980s they held a mirror up to white British society and asked: ‘Who do you think you are?’ Today it would be impossible to think of the identity of Britain without placing minorities at its core. Something similar is yet to happen to Scottish identity, and elite political actors will play a vital role these debates as they unfold. The point that this illustrates is that citizenship is not simply about a legal status but about the social and political field in which – in our case – minorities are confident and audible enough to participate in Scotland. In addition to the technical questions of equality of opportunity, some of this has to do with a sense of ownership over Scotland. Here there is a long-standing trend of self-identification and claims-making on Scottish identities by ethnic minorities. The important aspect here is the subjective confidence and willingness among minorities to stake such a claim. Yet it is not clear how (if at all) the stronger claims that come with this will be met.

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Notes

1. Different political contexts do of course express distinct stories. ‘In each case’, however, ‘the adoption of territorial autonomy for nationalist groups was initially controversial. But we now have sufficient experience to say that this model can indeed be a vehicle for “citizenization”, as Tully calls it (2002, 25)’ (Kymlicka 2011, 286).
2. A century earlier, the 1603 Union of the Crowns saw James VI take the throne in England, and with it “two of the key elements of sovereignty which were the traditional prerogative of the sovereign – foreign policy and war” (Pittock 2012, 12).
3. The most recent census told us that nearly 4% or 200,000 of Scotland’s population of more than 5 million consider themselves as minority ethnic. Scottish-Asian populations constitute the largest visible minorities, with just under 50,000 Pakistanis and more than
32,000 Indians. This is quite different from England where in the same year the ethnic minority proportion was 14%. However, the Scottish percentage is double what it was in 2001 and is expected to be approaching 10% by the middle of the century.

4. A less nuanced charge was made by Gordon Brown in his 2004 British Council address:

“Take devolution and nationalism … the issue is whether we retreat into more exclusive identities rooted in 19th century conceptions of blood, race and territory, or whether we are still able to celebrate a British identity which is bigger than the sum of its parts…” (Brown 2004).

5. The referendum was administered in Scotland within the parameters of the Scotland Act (1998) but sanctioned through a section 30 order (which temporarily modifies oversight of constitutional questions that are normally ‘reserved’ to Westminster).

6. All the independent members of the Scottish Parliament were at one time members of the SNP, although the broader Yes campaign includes a wider coalition of civil and political society actors (see http://www.yesscotland.net).

7. One reviewer queried why a gender balance was sought. Gender is widely accepted as an important indicator of political representativeness (Shirin 2000) and this study sought to take in as wide a body of the parliamentary legislature as the parameters would allow.

8. ‘Flower of Scotland’ was first employed by Scottish rugby in the early 1970s and Scottish football in the 1990s.


10. Which is not to say that they opposed them, but that the state should not necessarily be supporting them – that is, benign neglect should prevail.

References


