A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain

Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani

Abstract

Comparisons of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim sentiment (the latter also known as ‘Islamophobia’) are noticeably absent in British accounts of race and racism. This article critically examines some public and media discourse on Jewish and Muslim minorities to draw out the similarities and differences contained within anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim sentiment. It provides a rationale for focusing upon the period of greatest saliency for Jewish migrants prior to the Second World War, compared with the contemporary representation of Muslims, and identifies certain discursive tendencies operating within the representations of each minority. The article begins with a discussion of multiculturalism, cultural racism and racialization, followed by a brief exploration of the socio-historical dimensions of Jewish and Muslim groups, before turning to the public representation of each within their respective time-frames. The article concludes that there are both hitherto unnoticed similarities and important differences to be found in such a comparison, and that these findings invite further inquiry.

Introduction

Until the late nineteen eighties, the predominant paradigm for the study of ethnic minorities in Britain tended to enlist a white/black dualist conception of race (Modood, 2007, 1997, 1988), something that persists in British legal and policy conceptions of race as an involuntary identity (Meer, 2008; Solomos, 2003; Favell, 2001). Whilst it may therefore appear incongruous to learn that the application of race specific legislation has established precedents to redress discrimination against Jewish minorities in Britain, it becomes less so when we recognise that anti-Semitism tends to be paradigmatic of racism in Europe, while anti-Muslim sentiment is often viewed as less self-evidently racial in orientation (Goldberg, 2006). This is at least one explanation of why current race protections have never been directly extended to Muslim minorities in Britain.

In this article we argue that such tendencies neglect the ways in which there may be important analogies in the racial content of anti-Semitism and anti-
Muslim sentiment (also known as ‘Islamophobia’; see Meer and Modood, forthcoming (a); and Richardson, 2006). Without assuming any precise equivalence or, just as importantly, any determinism in outcome, we argue that a comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment could promise novel insights into our understanding of both, and that there are, moreover, several reasons that invite a comparative exploration. For example, since Jews and Muslims define themselves – and are defined by others – through reference to race and religion, it is reasonable to consider whether they have shared any similarities in their representation as constitutional religious minorities in the State. This is a pertinent issue because both minorities have formed non-Christian monotheistic – though heterogeneous – religious communities in an otherwise ‘Established’ Christian country. With diverging success, each minority has also tried to negotiate a pragmatic political incorporation that is mindful of the ways in which Britain as a nation-state has sometimes been imbued with ‘an ‘ideal’ of cultural homogeneity, established and reinforced through the state controlled acquisition of literate culture, alongside state control over entry and the acquisitions of citizenship’ (Morris, 1997: 194). Such an ideal, however, has led to mixed outcomes because both Jews and Muslims have, amongst other things, though with diverging success, won some important concessions in relation to faith schooling provisions (Meer, 2007a) and equality legislation (Meer, 2007b). Moreover, these have been achieved through a process dissimilar to Britain’s European neighbours (with the notable exception of Holland, see Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy, 2005), and which contrasts with the coercive-assimilationist or ius sanguinis-exclusive approaches of France and Germany respectively.

At the same time, the internal differences between historically long settled and more recently arrived Jewish minorities, and contemporary ‘moderate’ and allegedly ‘fundamentalist/radical’ Muslims, suggests that an interesting comparison may be found in how public and media discourses have represented each minority at different junctures. As it is argued in our methodology, for the former the internal contrast may have been most apparent during late 19th and early 20th century Jewish migration, while for Muslims the distinction is most pronounced today. We stress that it is important to recognise these mixed representations because some authors have argued that all modern nation-states embody an Enlightenment urge – which may not necessarily succeed in practice – to reduce differences to a majoritarian conceived unity. This is perhaps most lucidly articulated by Parekh (1997:233) who uses the example of national identity to describe how majorities can feel ‘possessive about the country for democratic, historical and other reasons and insist that the definition of national identity should reflect their privileged status’. The implication we draw from this concern is that the inclusion of minorities within nation-states must necessarily negotiate a potentially coercive ‘othering’ tendency.

In Britain, the mixed impact of this general tendency is perhaps best illustrated by sets of compensatory discourses and policies that are sometimes cast as a ‘peculiar’ British multicultural tradition (Meer and Modood, forthcoming...
(b). Whilst the detail of these policies will not be discussed here, mainly for methodological reasons as one of our minority cases arrived before this tradition gathered momentum, we should perhaps dwell on some of the ‘corrective’ elements of this tradition to consider the ambiguities of ‘othering’ that minorities can be subject to (see Rattansi, 2007: 114–31).

Multiculturalism, cultural racism and racialization

The idea of ‘multiculturalism’ has been described by Bhabha (1998: 31) as a ‘portmanteau term’ since it encapsulates a vast corpus of contested meanings (see Meer and Modood, 2008, for a critical discussion of different typologies). In this respect multiculturalism might be said to have a ‘vehicular’ quality that facilitates its simultaneous adoption and rejection in the pursuit or defence of similar social and political projects (cf McLennan, 2004). At the same time, it would not be unreasonable to argue that a widely recognised and/or central thrust of a great deal of what multiculturalism denotes includes a critique of ‘the myth of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states’ (Castles, 2000: 5), and an advocacy of the right of minority ‘cultural maintenance and community formation, linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination’ (ibid).

In helping us to understand how these different elements come together, and why they are relevant to a discussion of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment respectively, the ‘political multiculturalism’ of Tariq Modood is particularly instructive. This is because Modood has argued that what has sometimes been conceived of as a constellation of anti-racism and race equality agendas, should be reconciled with more Hegelian inspired ‘dialogical’ perspectives that speak of minority inclusion through a negotiated and inclusive nation-state citizenship. Whereas the many permutations of the former have sought, with mixed success, to prevent and redress involuntary racial identities from becoming a barrier to equality of opportunity, something often conceived as equality of access in the labour market, education and other public provision (see Meer, 2008), the latter has championed a ‘recognition’ of minority particularities and sensibilities, in a way that marks a departure from the imposed universalisms and/or exclusivity common to unreconstructed accounts of liberalism (Barry, 2001), republicanism (Pettit, 1999) and nationalism (Scruton, 2004).

What Modood wants to offer is an account that can reconcile race equality imperatives with the recognition of cultural difference (conceived in a broad sense as including religion and ethnicity). He thus argues that ‘when new groups enter a society, there has to be some education and refinement of . . . sensitivities in the light of changing circumstances and the specific vulnerabilities of new entrants’ (Modood, 2006: 61). An important part of his prescription includes his broadening of accounts of racism _per se_ and, more specifically, a rejection of the view that racism can only affect conventionally conceived racial minorities, an
argument that is frequently made to support the view that Muslims cannot be racial minorities because theirs is a religious identity that is voluntarily chosen. For Modood (2005: 56), such a view represents the antithesis of a negotiated multicultural inclusion that ignores the ways in which Muslims can, like Jews, be subject to practices of ‘cultural racism’ through the ways in which ‘“otherness” or “groupness” . . . [are] connected to cultural and racial otherness’. This, of course, requires some elaboration.

Cultural racism refers to the assumption that cultural difference functions like nature, through the ways in which ‘cultural demarcations are often drawn and used in a form that naturalizes them by implying that they are more or less immutable’ (Rattansi, 2007: 104 original emphasis). It is a phenomenon that has been characterised as a ‘new racism’ (Barker, 1981), ‘neo-racism’ (Balibar, 1991) and ‘differentialist racism’ (Modood, 1997), amongst others, as well as ‘a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences’ (Balibar, 1991: 21–2). Some have argued that whilst biological racism often exists prior to – and leads to the development of cultural racism, the latter replace the former, which has become discredited in a post-Holocaust, post-colonial era (Modood, 1997: 155). Others have maintained, however, that because ‘the ‘new racism’ coexists with and can easily slip into hard biological conceptions of stock and even species . . . it is easy to exaggerate the divide between an ‘old’ biological racism and a ‘new’ cultural racism’ (Rattansi, 2007: 100–1). This view should help us guard against temporally locating cultural racism as a recent phenomenon, especially since the studies of Cook and Clarke (1990: 134), amongst others, point to its presence ‘at the turn of the century’. Indeed, according to Balibar (1991: 17), anti-Semitism is cultural racism’s prototype.

In trying to distinguish these categories, specifically the racism levelled against Jews and Muslims, from one another and from classical ‘biological’ racism, Pnina Werbner (2005: 6) has offered a useful taxonomy that she presents in the language of ‘folk devils’. These include the ‘disobedient slave’ who carries a biologically marked difference that amounts to a visible presence that can be seen in the physicalising of Blacks in racist humour. Another includes that of the ‘malevolent witch’ who ‘crystallises fears of a hidden, disguised, malevolent stranger, of a general breakdown of trust, of a nation divided against itself’ (ibid). Her final folk devil is that of the ‘grand inquisitor’ who is neither subservient and slave like, nor a disguised or assimilated threat. Instead, ‘he is upfront, morally superior, openly aggressive, denying the validity of other cultures, in short – a different kind of folk devil altogether’ (ibid).

Werbner employs these categories to make distinctions between the racial othering of Blacks, Jews and Muslims, and argues that in public and media discourse Blacks have historically been placed within the first category, Jews in the second and Muslims in the third. She is surely right when she maintains that in the current climate Muslims face an additional hostility made up of ‘an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites as well as ‘real’
violent racists’ (Werbner, 2005: 6, see Meer (2006: 43–52) for examples of this amongst print media public intellectuals). At the same time she perhaps risks oversimplifying and reducing the logics of racism to discrete categories, as Modood (2006: 55) summarises:

Bosnian Muslims were ‘ethnically cleansed’ by people who were phenotypically, linguistically, and culturally the same as themselves because they came to be identified as an ‘ethnic’ or a ‘racial’ group.12

In this example Muslims may equally have been ‘witches’ turned into ‘slaves’ so that, moreover, it may not necessarily be helpful to characterise Muslims in contemporary Europe as ‘inquisitor’ figures when they lack the sorts of discursive or structural legitimacy commonly associated with this characterisation. Nevertheless, in trying to typologize the distinction between biological racism, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment, Werbner’s typology is complemented by Goldberg’s (2006: 331) study, ‘mapping the racial contours of contemporary European self-conception, historically understood’. In this he traces ‘the European imaginary of the European, the Black, the Jew, and the Muslim’ (ibid.) to argue that while ‘the relational frame for thinking through race in the European context has usually been ordered in dualistic terms . . . there is a third major artery’ (ibid 362). This is comprised of ‘“The Muslim” ’ (ibid 344) which, in Bleich’s (2006: 17) terms, ‘has all the earmarks of classic racialization’, namely ‘the classification of such a group as inherently dangerous and inferior’ (ibid). Part of the weakness of Bleich’s analysis is helpfully drawn out by Rattansi’s (2007: 107) otherwise supportive advocacy of ‘racialization’ as an analytical concept that can ‘move research and political argument away from the unproductive debates on whether any particular individuals, propositions, claims, and doctrines, are simply “racist” or “non-racist” ’. He continues:

Instead, the field is opened up to more useful analyses of the different mixes of biological and cultural connotations of difference, superiority and inferiority that emerge in public and private statements, conversations, jokes, and so forth. [. . .] Racialization also does not imply that those subjected to it are necessarily regarded as inferior (ibid).

In looking for evidence of both cultural and biological racisms in both case studies, we do not limit ourselves to an either-or distinction. Rather, typologies such as Werbner’s and Bleich’s will be used in a mixed fashion. We will continue to use the term ‘cultural racism’ to refer to hybrid racialisations, but the existence of biological tropes that continue to denote distinctions should be kept in mind. Moreover, Rattansi’s last point is of particular import in that it facilitates the deviation from purely pejorative and negative racializations, and we argue that there is indeed evidence for this in our findings below.
The methodological rationale

The study takes heed of these different conceptualisations of racism and racialization in order to explore the ways that public and media discourses have characterised Jews and Muslims in similar and dissimilar ways, during different periods of their presence in Britain. We do this to consider what the operation of past racialization might tell us about its present articulation. So while it is critical to reiterate that this comparison requires attention to both analogies and disanalogies, it is argued that several overarching reasons make this an important research endeavour. These include the historical-structural similarities, described at the beginning of this paper, in both the larger political context as well as the internal heterogeneity of Jews and Muslims. As such, an empirical exploration of similarities and dissimilarities in the representation of each minority may work to enlighten and nuance dichotomous categories, and evidence greater scope for mixed perceptions of the other, in line with claims decrying the over-simplicity of a biological-cultural distinction in analyses of racism. Moreover, and because of the differential treatment of Jews and Muslims in British legal formulae, in being conceived as a ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ minorities respectively (Meer, 2008), an analysis of public and media discourses may encourage a less rigid or binary interpretation of the political and legal treatment and perception of each group. As such, an analysis of public and media discourses might reveal something valuable about common beliefs and underlying value systems (McQuail, 1994), such that if one was to consider the dynamics of media discourse as being more epiphenomenal with respect to wider societal concerns, analysis would still reveal views held, even if these are not in and of themselves efficacious (and pernicious). This is particularly relevant because the study explores some of the commonsense arguments that, as Favell and Modood (2003: 493) have argued, fail to do justice to the complexity of ‘hard cases’, and encourage a conflation between fact and fiction when there is a reliance ‘on the unchallenged reproduction of anecdotal facts usually taken from newspapers’. Indeed, and in making a broader point about the currency of media discourse, van Dijk (1999 quoted in Richardson, 2001: 148) supports this view when he states that ‘speakers routinely refer to . . . newspapers as their source (and authority) of knowledge or opinions about ethnic minorities’; this also suggests that ‘social theories are (re)produced in the social worlds by the news media, influencing audience attitudes, values and beliefs’ (Richardson, 2001: 148). This is a key point because while it is may be difficult to gauge a link between ‘thought’ and ‘action’, or how negative or positive conceptions of Jews or Muslims may translate into racist violence against, or beneficial treatment of, these minorities, what we can point to are the studies of Wilson and Gutierrez (1995: 45) which show that ‘negative, one-sided or stereotypical media portrayals and news coverage do reinforce racist attitudes in those members of the audience who do have them and can channel mass actions against the group that is
stereotypically portrayed’. To this end this article reports on a general level content analysis of argumentation strategies evidenced in public and media discourse (for detailed discussion of ‘argumentation strategies’ see Meer, 2006; Poole, 2002 and Richardson, 2001). These are refined in the following ways:

- A focus on public discourse: limited to representations in media; political speeches in Parliament and other public forums; representation within the Trade Union movement, and representation in popular culture and literature.
- The time frames selected are the period of greatest saliency for Jewish migrants prior to the Second World War, and, for Muslims, the recent period within which the public perceptions of a distinct Muslim identity and a crisis about Muslims became most salient, including events such as the Rushdie Affair, 9/11 and 7/7.
- The topics for analysis encompass both rhetoric at a general level, and indicative examples at a specific level. These include accounts of cultural dysfunction, incompatibility and unassimilability; ideas of self segregation; representations of ‘difference’; attitudes towards and construction of claims for the accommodation of difference (eg in diet, ritual slaughter, personal religious law, days of worship) and fears over loyalty to the Crown and State.

Since this is a discursive rather than quantitative study, the examples and points of contention therein are selected not solely for their frequency of occurrence, but also for their symbolic and political saliency.

**Pre-War migrant and settled Jews**

Having been expelled in 1290 by a decree of King Edward I, there was no official Jewish presence in Britain until the reign of Oliver Cromwell (except for isolated individuals who practiced Judaism secretly). While Cromwell never officially readmitted Jews to Britain, a small community of Sephardic Jews living in London were granted residence in 1656, largely because of Cromwell’s need of their financial assistance. This and subsequent communities developed, however, and were complemented by the figure of 120,000 European Jews who, between 1870 and 1914, migrated to Britain. Thus at the beginning of the First World War the Jewish population of Britain is estimated to have numbered around 300,000 (Gartner, 1973: 30; Pollins, 1982: 130).

It is important to reiterate, that this figure included both destitute newcomers fleeing the Pogroms and/or economic deprivation in Russia, as well as established British Jews who, through organisations such as the Jewish Board of Guardians (JBG), Board of Deputies of British Jews, and Jewish Free Schools (JFS), frequently provided the main source of welfare to these newcomers. Concentrated in areas of Leeds and the East End of London, these
new migrants arrived with little capital and few possessions, and were considered visibly different from their settled British Jewish counterparts who were, in some respects, politically and socially established (Lipman, 1990: 48). The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for example, had become institutionally incorporated as the representative body of Jews in Britain, especially under the leadership of Montefiore13 between 1835 and 1874. Indeed, the prosperity of the Victorian period allowed established Jewish families to increasingly enter the upper echelons of politics and society, as epitomised, for example, in Anthony Nathan de Rothschild (1810–1876) becoming the first Jewish Member of Parliament. These more established families increasingly assumed a leadership in the complex voluntary bodies within the British Jewish presence (Lipman, 1990: 17). There was even some evidence of the ability of Jewish leaders to make representations on the behalf of Jews outside Britain, exemplified by Montefiore’s efforts to protect Jews in Syria and the Ottoman Empire. Where these interests overlapped with British foreign policy interests, such initiatives were successful. Yet, it was the same foreign policy issues that fuelled extensive and violent anti-Semitic episodes, especially during times of crisis. This was epitomised by what become known as the ‘Bulgarian Affair’, and which concerned Benjamin Disraeli’s support for the established British policy buttressing Turkey against Russia, and the way in which it was construed as evidence of his Jewish origins (Holmes, 1979: 10–12). It is also exemplified by the manner in which the Boer War was presented as a conflict pursued solely to protect Jewish financial interests in the mining industry, as explored below.

**Muslims in Contemporary Britain**

Compared with their Jewish counterparts, the large-scale Muslim migration to Britain has been much more recent. Although there has been a long established Muslim community in Britain, made up of North African (particularly Yemeni) and East Indian sea-faring migrants (Ansari, 2004), the major part of the approximate 1.6 million Muslim presence is the outcome of post-war commonwealth immigration from India, East Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh.14 The socio-economic profile of these groups varied on arrival but included those from rural backgrounds with low skills and little formal education who became concentrated in factories, transport and blue collar work, whilst the more skilled and qualified Indian and East-African Asians fared much better in the labour market, in much the same way that their children would later in the education system (Modood et al., 1997). Although there is evidence of some social mobility amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups, it remains the case that Muslims are currently concentrated in the most socially deprived strata of employment, education, and housing (Abrams and Houston, 2006, Performance Innovation Unit, 2001) with some evidence of disproportionately bad health (Nazroo, 2003). This is compounded by an
increasing change in profile and balance between South Asian and other newly arrived national origin groups such as Middle-Eastern, Afghani, Somali, Bosnian and other Eastern European immigrants who are contributing to the category of ‘Muslim’ in Britain.

In terms of the public and media discourse it was the Salman Rushdie Affair that alerted the public imagination to the presence of minorities who subscribed not solely to a national identity or a south Asian regionalism (and even less to an anti-racist political blackness), but to a potentially universal Muslim identity that provided an increasingly salient category in the course of self-identification and public claims-making (Samad, 1992; Modood, 1990). The cacophony of Muslim protests over the publication of the novel, and the near universal condemnation of these contestations, initiated the eventual creation of a Muslim umbrella body paralleling earlier Jewish organisations. Just as importantly, however, it elicited the notion of ‘fundamentalism’ within Islam and amongst Muslims. As discussed below, this would soon be contrasted with ‘moderate’ Islam and Muslims. It was not long after the Rushdie Affair, however, that the war in Bosnia and the images of British-Muslim solidarity made the existence of an audible Muslim presence unmistakeable. Most recently the events of 9/11 and the accompanying War on Terror have, as explored below, coupled Muslims and Islam in the public imagination with violence and terrorism (Fekete, 2004).

**Similarities and differences in the representation of Jews and Muslims**

A good topic for a comparison of discursive representation is provided by the issue of assimilation since, contrary to the present image of assimilated Jews, there was for a long time a strong current of argumentation denouncing Jews as unassimilable. Not only was this projected upon Jewish minorities, but it was maintained that this was a course pursued by Jewish minorities themselves. For example, Arnold White, an influential commentator writing in the *Contemporary Review*, characterised the Jewish experience in Britain as

> . . . not that of numbers, nor of habits, nor of occupations of the immigrants but the fact that, good or bad or indifferent the orthodox immigrants belong to a race and cling to a community that prefers to remain aloof from the mainstream of our national life, by shunning intermarriage with Anglo-Saxons (*Contemporary Review* xxii, 1897: 738).

White’s claim entails a rejection of ‘difference’ in favour of an absolute identification with the values and aspirations of an unspecified ‘national life’. Although undefined, this space is constructed against the presence of Jewish minorities through an operating assumption of incompatibility between British and Jewish interests, both domestically and internationally. To this end
White insisted that integration was not a religious question and had nothing to do with whether the destitute immigrant believed in the Bible or the Torah. It was, in truth, a racial question. This was a common and salient position coherently exemplified in a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle* (21 November 1902 – signed by an anonymous ‘Mile End Socialist’)

‘Jew versus Gentile’ will be my battle cry at every election as long as life is spared... the Jew has made himself obnoxious through the incarnate instinct of his race to every nation where he has now emigrated. This is an historical fact and beyond controversy.

It is crucial to note, however, the ways in which these persistent charges were not directed at *all* Jews, but specifically newer migrants, and how these views proceeded to inform governmental thinking. For example, the *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), which listed Whitechapel and Mile End as a ‘Jerusalem’ or a ‘Second Palestine’ (ibid 178), reports complaints that Jews too often lived ‘according to their traditions, usages and customs’ (ibid 298) in a way that was detrimental for society. That public anxieties over perceived Jewish self-segregation were mired in a racialised resentment was particularly evident when it came to the prospect of accommodating differences. As Holmes (1979: 25) describes:

> It was in fact a persistent theme that Jews kept themselves apart. ‘When in Rome do as the Romans do’ was observed as a guide to social behaviour by ‘every race except the alien Jews’, it was claimed. It was pointed out that Jews ignored local ‘customs’, ‘religious observances’, ‘days of rest’, and contravened established morality.

These conceptions of incompatibility and unassailability were not solely derived from ideas of self-segregation, however, but ran deeper in being attributable to the intrinsic cultural disposition or make-up of Jews as a race or nation. For example, the *East London Advertiser* consistently ran editorials decrying the frustrating maintenance of a Jewish identity or ways of life amongst recent migrants

> People of any other nation, after being in England for a short time, assimilate themselves with the native race and by and by lose nearly all their foreign trace. But the Jews never do. A Jew is always a Jew. No doubt this is due to their desire for the formation of a new Hebrew nation, a fact which inclines them to look upon themselves as pilgrims in a strange land (*Editorial*, 6 May 1899).

It is worth noting the presence and operation of both biological *and* cultural racism here indicating that Werbner’s folk devils are best considered as analytical rather than descriptive categories, concuring with Rattansi (2007) in that
each is present to different degrees in any particular instance of racism. Thus, while the claim that biological racism has become untenable in a post-Holocaust, post-colonial era does not denote that the pre-Holocaust depiction of Werbner’s ‘malevolent witch’ must contain the tropes of biological racism, it is certainly compatible with the suggestion that such a biological-cultural composite racism was also present in earlier periods. This complements Balibar’s (1991) argument that the anti-Semitism of our time-frame was prototypical – not the same as, but still emerging from, that which preceded it, while supporting Modood’s (2005: 11) linkages between racial and religious markers, specifically the ways in which ‘religion can be the basis of racialisation as long as the religion of a group can be linked to physical ancestry and descent.’

How, then, might this contrast with the representation of Muslims today? It is certainly the case that, since 9/11, the explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural dysfunctionality has generated a profitable discursive economy in accounting for what is described as ‘Islamic terrorism’. Before this is illustrated below, it is worth noting that terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Islamism’ tend to be highly contested and relational – at best, valid only after careful qualification and contextualisation. This point is a convincingly made in Denoeux’s (2002 cited in Jackson, 2006) argument that the term ‘fundamentalism’, for example, is particularly misleading because of the connotations derived from its origins in early twentieth century American Protestantism, and so it is not easily applied to Islam and Muslims. Despite the problematic nature of the term it remains the case that ‘fundamentalism is made flesh by drawing upon examples of “Islamic Fundamentalism” ’ with the effect that it has become a metaphor for fundamentalism in general (Sayyid, 1997: 7–8). In reality, the dividing line between such categories as ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘moderates’ is not only context-specific, but constantly shifting and dependent upon political value-judgements (Modood and Ahmed, 2007).

It is nevertheless increasingly common to find the portrayal of a seamless association between the two, which is perhaps an example of what Jackson (2006) has called a culturally embedded ‘hard’ discourse because so many other assumptions compound and reinforce it. One of these is that since ‘Islamic terrorists’ are products of a fanatical strain of Islam, the violence that is committed by Muslims ‘evolves out of something inherent in the religion, rendering any Muslim a potential terrorist’ (Poole, 2002: 4). This marks an inversion of Arnold White’s earlier comment that Jewish integration was not a religious but racial question, in that such essentialising comments work to embed the terrorist threat into some perceived ‘essence’ of what is a religious category. At the same time, while some scholars go to great lengths to argue that most Muslims consider violence and terrorism to be an egregious violation of their religion (see Haliday, 2003: 107), at the level of public discourse attempts to de-couple this view are often dismissed as oversensitive (cf Phillips, 2006; Gove, 2006; Cohen, 2007 and Anthony, 2007). Thus Tony Blair has often stated that ‘the security threat that this Islamic extremism poses is the government’s primary responsibility’ (2004).
One of the arguments that this has given rise to is that ‘moderate’ Muslims must take the lead in fighting the extremism that underpins this ‘Islamic terrorism’. For example, Baran (2005: 84) argues that a central counter-terrorism task is ‘to find ways of helping moderates win the theological and ideological civil war currently taking place within the Muslim world’ (see also Haqqani, 2003). Similarly, the former Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket asked Muslims in Britain ‘to stand up to extremists’ (quoted in The Guardian, 9 November, 2006), whilst another former government Minister, Patricia Hewitt, demanded that Muslims ‘in positions of responsibility and leadership stand up against the propaganda and against the perverted form of extremist Islam that a dangerous minority in the Muslim community wants to impose’ (quoted in the New Statesman, 25 July, 2005). These sentiments have reflected those of commentators who argue that certain trans-cultural requirements are necessary for the creation of an acceptable Muslim presence in Britain. The Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee is instructive in this regard:

When a generation of Lenny Henry and Meera Syals made it possible to invite others to laugh with them about their own communities, those communities entered into the canon of Britishness. [...] the most dangerous divide now is in culture – and that means Muslim. British Muslims arrested last week as terror suspects had families as British as Meera Syal’s – yet culturally they inhabit another universe (Toynbee, The Guardian, 7 April 2004).

Whilst Blacks (Lenny Henrys) and Indians (Meera Syals) provide Toynbee with examples of ‘good’ minorities, Muslims are particularly problematic in her schema because they cannot ridicule themselves, and this denies them entry ‘into the canon of Britishness’. It is important to note that we are not making any simple parallels here between earlier Jewish minorities and present Muslim minorities. What we are claiming, however, is that there are forms of pathologising of each group, constituted through a cultural racism, and that this is evident in Toynbee’s disqualification of Muslims from Britishness. This disqualifying tendency is shared by Charles Moore’s argument that ‘Islam is not an exotic addition to the English country garden’:

Once there are Islamic financial institutions, how long will it be before Muslims insist that the state and business direct all their monetary dealings with Muslims through these institutions (boycotting businesses with Jewish connections en route)? How long before Muslims, extending the logic of their concentration in places like Bradford and Leicester, seek to establish their own law within these areas, the germ of a state within a state? And how diverse would such a state be? (Moore, The Daily Telegraph, 21 August 2004)

Moore not only emphasises one extreme of many potential outcomes, but does so in a manner that is misleading because he suggests that such an outcome is
inevitable. Holmes (1979: 20) catalogues how similar techniques were used in presenting Jews as desiring self-segregation and attempting to achieve these subversive ends through the malign exercise of Jewish social, political and financial power. Once again, this was particularly the case with the newer Jewish immigrants who were attributed a degree of inflexibility derived from their orthodoxy and which, in itself, suggests an internal distinction between the racialization of, on the one hand, newer and, on the other hand, more settled Jewish minorities. The practice amongst newer Jewish immigrants of working on Sundays, for example, was presented as un-English (Gartner, 1973: 52), and the ensuing opposition often reflected a rank and file anti-Semitism evidenced in the words of trade union leader Ben Tillet, in the official Independent Labour Party (ILP) paper *Labour Leader*:

> If getting on is the most desirable thing in this earth then the Jew, as the most consistent and determined money grabber we know is worthy of the greatest respect. That his money grabbing is not universally respected only proves that the bulk of civilised nations, even now, do not believe in the commercialistic idea of clean hands and blood-stained money (19 December 1894, quoted in Cohen, 1985: 76).

This may be contrasted with how, in the present context, the unwillingness to conform to secular liberal values is construed as the greatest obstacle facing Muslim integration. For example, during their respective time frames, the case studies evidence a propensity for malign distortions of Jewish and Muslim customs that fail to take into account the reality of each minority’s social, economic and political power. Hence recently arrived Jewish minorities in the East End were, for all intents and purposes, powerless at a time when they were portrayed as carving out a ‘new Jerusalem’ on British soil. The recent comments of the Bishop of Rochester, the Right Reverend Dr Michael Nazir-Ali, that Muslims have turned ‘already separate communities into ‘no-go’ areas’, and tried to ‘impose an Islamic character on certain areas’, are uncannily reminiscent of these earlier charges.17 Similarly, there is little evidence of a significant Muslim desire for, let alone capacity to insist upon, ‘Islamic law’ for the whole of Britain, and yet it is precisely this prospect that is used to exaggerate their supposed threat. Nevertheless, an important difference is that Muslims in contemporary Britain do enjoy some protections of cultural difference in a way that their Jewish counterparts at an earlier time would have lacked. Indeed, this informs the complaint that under the guise of multicultur- alism, Britain has conceded ‘too much’. As Richard Littlejohn of the *Daily Mail* bemoans

> There must be no more concessions, no special treatment, no more apologies for perceived slights for which we are not responsible. Otherwise where does it end? Will we all have to give up alcohol, will all women have to wear
the jilbab, will Britain become a place where everything stops for prayers, simply to satisfy Muslim sensibilities? (Littlejohn, 10 February 2006).

The looming spectre of ‘fundamentalist/radical’ Muslims was exemplified by the incredibly sensationalist reportage of the Policy Exchange’s (2007) report on Muslim social attitudes – ‘Living Apart Together’ – which generated an avalanche of alarming headlines from broadsheets and tabloids across the political spectrum. Hence The Sun told its readers that ‘Islam kids “reject UK” ’ whilst the Independent uncritically adopted Policy Exchange’s official line in reporting that ‘Young Muslims are ‘more militant’. The Daily Mail went further in characterising Muslim youth as ‘A Generation of Outsiders’ whilst The Daily Telegraph summarised by reporting that ‘40% want Sharia law in Britain’.

One of the astonishing tendencies displayed throughout this reportage was an uncritical acceptance of the findings from a think-tank that has an explicit political agenda. Michael Gove, the Conservative MP and author of the book Celsius 7/7 – How the West’s Policy of Appeasement Has Provoked Fundamentalist Terror and What Has to Be Done Now, is a founding chairperson. Charles Moore is another key figure, the research director, Dean Godson, is a signatory to the ‘Project for a New American Century’, while the report’s lead author, Munira Mirza, is a long time critic of Muslims and multiculturalism. The report itself confirmed that younger Muslims are more religiously observant than their parents. Thus 37 percent of their sample of 16 to 24 yr olds agreed that they would like to see more aspects of Shar’ia law in Britain, and that this is roughly twice as many as a sample their parents’ age. One of the many difficulties with this finding is that it is arguable that the vast majority of people who describe themselves as ‘Muslim’ in Britain already subscribe to Shar’ia either by fasting during Ramadan, or eating halal food, donating to charity, observing prayers, celebrating Eid and so forth. Indeed, since the 1970s some marital and inheritance disputes have been judged in Shar’ia courts if both parties have freely consented to such adjudication, and this has taken place under the broader remit of English civil law. Where the application of Shar’ia has contravened English civil law it has been rejected by the courts. Whilst there are undoubtedly aspects of Shar’ia that sanction capital punishment, particularly with respect to the crimes of rape and murder, these form only very small part of a vast corpus and are no less contested than those non-Shar’ia practices of capital punishment currently exercised in some liberal-democracies. Moreover, established bodies, such as the Muslim Law Council in West London, neither possess nor seek a remit for criminal law.

These simple qualifications were omitted in both the report’s analysis and the press coverage which described British Muslims who aspire toward some Shar’ia as ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘radical’ (indeed the Daily Star took its readers back a million years to the paleolithic era with the headline: ‘BRIT MUSLIMS WANT THE STONE AGE’). This is comparable to denouncing British Christians for believing in the Resurrection and it is arguable that such hyperbole is
capable of fuelling moral panics that do more to distort and reify concerns over minority groups than to precipitate solutions. This is particularly so when materially ungrounded claims concerning the disastrous aspirations of minorities are consistently articulated as self-evident truths. It is unsurprising, then, to find Muslims, and Islam more broadly, being characterised as anti-modern and antipathetic to democratic and human rights. Will Hutton, for example, writing in *The Observer*, argued that

Islam is predominantly sexist and pre-Enlightenment and that is the core of the problem both within the Islamic world and in its relationship with the West. Thus, the West has to object to Islamic sexism whether arranged marriage, headscarves, limiting career options or the more extreme manifestations, female circumcision and stoning women for adultery (11 January, 2004).

Hutton’s argumentation strategy is to simultaneously assume and conclude that Islam and ‘Islamic practices’ are predominantly ‘pre-Enlightenment’. The result of this understanding becomes apparent when seeking to explain ‘Islam’s relationship with the West’. The latter is counterpoised as a corrective to pre-Enlightenment exemplars of ‘Islamic sexism’; practices deemed to cause the problematic nature of Islam’s incapacity to relate to a non-sexist, egalitarian West. So for ‘West’ read ‘Modern’. With this in mind, Muslim contributions to British society should be restricted because what Muslim men do to Muslim women is both symptomatic of broader ‘Islamic practices’ and is antipathetic to ‘our’ beliefs. A combative response is, then, required since ‘their own cultural context’ is evidently unable to renew itself without a civilising hand. Such a process necessarily begins by shoring up ‘our’ own values, and mistakenly encourages the belief that all Muslim practices conflict with liberal freedoms (cf. Barry, 2001).

Exploring potentially fruitful linkages in the representation of Jewish and Muslim Threats

In returning to our earlier discussion of cultural racism and racialization, it appears that a recurring feature of anti-Semitism the way in which Jewish minorities were imagined to be exercising a hidden power, which contrasts with the way in which Muslims are currently represented. This is because throughout the extracts presented above it appears that rather than being hidden, Muslims are deemed problematic *precisely because* they are publicly assertive and thus actively aggressive. Two recent examples help illustrate this point. Firstly, in his account of the decision of the House of Lords in the Shabina Begum case,18 the editor of the *Spectator*, Member of Parliament and London mayoral candidate, Boris Johnson, commenting in the *The Daily*
Telegraph, problematised the girl’s petition to wear the Muslim jilbab when attending her local comprehensive school by characterising it as an orchestrated exercise of Muslim aggression.

This case wasn’t even about religion, or conscience, or the dictates of faith. At least it wasn’t primarily about those things. It was about power. It was about who really runs the schools in this country, and about how far militant Islam could go in bullying the poor, cowed, gelatinous and mentally spongi-form apparatus of the British state (Johnson, 23 March 2006).

It is important to note the method of simplifying the debate at the expense of appreciating the variety of views it entails, by reducing Shabina Begum’s petition to demands made by ‘militant Islam’. The second example accentuates this more clearly through an explicit comparison of Jews and Muslims. In another article from the The Daily Telegraph, Charles Moore urges British Muslims to heed, as an exemplar, the experience of British Jews. Over the last 350 years, he argues, the wealth of contributions made to British culture by the ‘Jewish race’ invites us to consider:

. . . why such a people have been able to overcome prejudices that at first excluded them absolutely and later accepted them only on qualified terms (Jews could not sit in Parliament until the mid-19th century, for example). The answer could be useful for everyone (Moore, 17 June, 2006).

The reason, according to Moore, is that all Jewish denominations agree that they must accept civil law, so long as it does not force them to contravene religious law, and that this explains why Jews have maintained a peaceful existence in British society. Speaking of Dayan Ehrentreu, the Chief Justice of the Chief Rabbi’s court, Moore concludes:

If Judaism were an aggressive religion, seeking to lay down its law for all mankind, then this supremely learned old gentleman could acquire menacing power. Like the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran after 1979, Dayan Ehrentreu could tell people to kill in the name of God. Instead, his effect is the opposite (ibid).

In his argument, Moore assumes that there is an incompatibility between Islamic and British civil law, and concludes by extending this as a problem pertaining to all Muslims. Whilst doing so, he attributes to his monolithic version of Islam an inherent aggressiveness, without offering any valid justification. There is clear slippage here between the notion that Jewish religious law instructs Jews to obey civic law, and that what is creating tension must be aggressive. Of course, politics is constituted by an abundance of tensions, but in practice Britain has historically maintained an air of pragmatism on such matters. The existence of tensions between Islamic jurisprudence and British
civil law is therefore nothing new and ignores the successful compromises discussed earlier. As such Moore’s position ignores crucial, on-the-ground, pragmatic compromises in both cases, instead harking back to a notion of original contracts to ascertain compatibility. Moreover, his use of the liberal compromise to illustrate the successful accommodation of British-Jews ignores the ways in which it failed to curb anti-Semitism. This is despite the fact that while there were some attempts to push for an accommodation of difference by Montefiore (specifically a recognition of Jewish marriages in the mid 1850s), on the whole the approach was one of ‘privatising’ religion with no public manifestation or accommodation of difference. Furthermore, Moore’s idealistic celebration of the liberal compromise becomes even more implausible at key moments: whenever there was a national crisis the place of Jews and their status as British was questioned in a way that is not totally dissimilar to the questioning of Muslim loyalty today.

For example, one of the striking features of the post 9/11 discourse is the extent to which it is marked by a concern over dual and divided loyalties and, even more so since 7/7, public perceptions of the threat posed by Muslim disloyalty. This fear frames and reduces complex choices to binary options. The following readers’ letters illustrate this well:

Muslim soldiers have expressed their reluctance to fight in Iraq as they may kill fellow Muslims. The old question for these Muslims has become: who is sovereign: Queen (the State) or Mohamed? Unfortunately those who perpetrated the 7/7 bombings clearly gave their answer to that question (Letters, June 10 2006, The Independent).

Muslim fundamentalists feel no loyalty to Britain and the values of democratic and peaceful debate, because they adhere to an ideology which does not see any value in Britishness (Letters, The Times, 9 June 2006)

Throughout the discussion of how this problem will endure, British Muslim leadership is accused of appeasing such militant views:

If foreign extremists are a major problem so, alas, are a minority of British-born Muslims who place religious fanaticism above any notion of loyalty to their country. In such circumstances one would hope for wise leadership within the Muslim community. Instead, the supposedly ‘moderate’ Sir Iqbal Sacranie pops up to say that the July 7 attacks would not have happened if we had not gone to war in Iraq. What will be the reason given for the next attack; that we are too pro Israeli, or too tough on Iran. This will not do. Those who feel blind loyalty to Islam and none whatever to Britain should go and live in an Islamic country and leave the rest of us in peace (Leader, Daily Express, 3 June 2006).

Each extract points to an ever-present tension between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘moderates’, and at first sight it may seem that there is little mileage in
searching for a comparator to this problematisation of Muslim allegiances. However, if again one moves away from the substance of the ideology to focus on processes of racialisation that underpin it, one possible analogy reveals itself. We tentatively suggest that this can be found in the way in which British Jews were associated with anarchism and bolshevism. In these terms the analogy operates on the following racialised poles: (i) recently arrived Jews/anarchist bolsheviks; (ii) ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims/Islamic Terrorists. Whilst we accept that these are not perfect comparisons, and would like to guard against any such interpretation, it is worth remembering how from the 1860s onward there were a number of anarchist uprisings and bombings throughout Europe, and London soon became a refuge for some of those involved in these movements. While most anarchists were peaceful, a tiny minority resorted to violent attacks such as the bombing of Greenwich Observatory in 1894 – described at the time as an ‘international terrorist outrage’ because anarchist violence was an international phenomenon:

In Europe it claimed hundreds of lives, including those of several heads of government, and resulted in anti-terrorism laws. In the siege of Sidney Street in London in 1911, police and troops confronted east European Jewish anarchists. This violent confrontation in the heart of London created a racialised moral panic in which the whole Jewish community was stigmatised. It was claimed that London was ‘seething with violent aliens, and the British establishment was said to be ‘in a state of denial’ (Malik, 2007).

Long before the ‘Londonistan’ (Phillips, 2006) thesis characterised the capital as a hot-bed of ‘Islamic terrorists’, it was recently arrived East End Jews who were said to pose the threat of politically-motivated radical violence. The editorial of the *Evening News* (22 May 1891), for example, described ‘[t]he advance of socialistic and anarchical opinion in London [as] commensurate with the increased volume of foreign immigration.’ This theme recurred during the First World War when the status of the new Russian Jewish immigrants was additionally problematised because they were not naturalised and could not therefore be conscripted. This was compounded by other issues including the fact that these Jews were unwilling to align themselves with a Czarist Russia responsible for the pogroms, at a time when public discourse widely held that Russian socialism was the ideology of ‘the Jews’. As Holmes (1979: 208) recounts, ‘a central stress was placed upon Britain and the British Empire as the repositories of Christian civilisation and it was this system which was believed to be under attack from Jewish influences’. This would later be supported in Goldberg’s (2006) mapping of Europe as a repository of Christian civilisation in the ways discussed at the beginning of this article.

There is perhaps some overlap between the manner in which recently arrived Jews were racialised as ‘undemocratic’ with the way in which ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims are feared to be today. For example, in the words of S. H. Jeyes, recently arrived Jews were ‘politically unfit to be suddenly transplanted
into those democratic institutions for which we have adapted ourselves by a long course of self-governing liberty’. It is thus uncanny that the Evening Standard could recently hold an event entitled ‘Is Islam Good for London?’, with a preamble stating:

Is Islam Good for London? is a simple question but one of the most important for our city today . . . the Muslim population is growing and the threat of extremism has strained relations between Muslims and their host communities . . .

The connection with the contemporary representation of a clash of civilisations seems striking and Connolly (2005: 6) makes this point well when he writes that ‘the terrorism of Al Qaeda, in turn generates new fears and hostilities, and priorities. The McCarthyism of our day, if it arrives, will connect internal state security to an exclusionary version of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.’ The anti-Jewish rhetoric, meanwhile, became more pronounced during and after 1917 as the Civil War in Russia pitched Bolshevik and British interests against one another. Under the ownership of Lord Northcliffe, The Times was implicated in this discourse by, amongst other things, underpinning its critique of communism with reference to a ‘Jewish–Bolshevik’ conspiracy. One of the correspondents, Stephen Graham, who frequently reported on Russia and the revolutions, often wrote articles propagating the idea of a Jewish conspiracy, as the following extract exemplifies:

The Jews interpreted certain prophecies in the Talmud as referring to the fate of Russia . . . one cannot be surprised that fervent Jews see in the destruction of Russia a biblical visitation of the vengeance of God upon those who have persecuted His people. With all respect, it is an incredibly exaggerated vengeance. Pharoh and the Egyptians got off very lightly in comparison (quoted in Kaddish, 1992: 23–4)

What is of interest is the intentional use of particularly religious references, in ways reminiscent of how contemporary discourses can conflate Islam and terrorism, as discussed earlier. For example, the projection of a Jewish vengeance via Bolshevism also informed The Times’ accusation against those who supported peace with the Bolsheviks, at the Paris peace conference of 1919, of being subverted by Jewish interests. In fact Steed notoriously accused a Jewish writer at the Manchester Guardian of being complicit in this ‘conspiracy’ (Kaddish, 1992: 29), and his campaign culminated in the Times’ publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, alongside an article entitled ‘The Jewish Peril’ (8 May 1920) (see Kaddish, 1992: 31).

Conclusions

This study has tried to discern what analogies and disanalogies can be drawn between historical anti-Semitism and present anti-Muslim sentiment. It has
theorised and explored empirically what our understanding of racism directed at one minority can tell us about the operation of racism directed at another minority. We do not wish to deny however the ways in which this may lead to mixed outcomes, and therefore encourage further investigation and development of these issues. Such investigation should seek to eschew crude politico-legal distinctions between anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment, and pay closer attention to the ways in which biological and cultural discourses are both invoked in the racialisation of religious minorities.

Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, and Departments of Sociology and Law, University of Bristol

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Notes

1 This article is based upon a paper presented at the Forum for the Comparative Study of Jews and Muslims at Royal Holloway, London. We would like to thank Maleiha Malik, Tariq Modood and Pepper Smith, plus the editor, Mike Savage, editorial assistant, Caroline Baggaley, and three anonymous reviewers from The Sociological Review for their helpful comments on the arguments presented below. Of course all responsibility for the final version rests with the authors.

2 Whilst it would be easy to state at the beginning that the idea of race is used under ‘erasure’ as in Derrida (1976), or rejected outright in the manner preferred by Miles (1989), it will instead be argued that since all categories including ethnicity, age, gender and class are unstable and contested; subject to potential reification and essentialism, the implication of ‘race’ as ‘real’ is dismissed at the outset. The idea of race should instead be understood as a social construction that nevertheless serves as a potential vehicle for subjective and attributed identifications. Rather than offering a post-race account (Gilroy, 2000; St. Louis, 2002), this article will discuss the social reality of race and racism.

3 Including the Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, 1976 as amended in 2000) which, cumulatively, define the statutory public duty to promote ‘good race relations’ and outlaw discrimination based upon race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins.


5 The ethnic heterogeneity of Muslims in Britain has been deemed sufficient to disqualify their inclusion as an ethnic or racial grouping within the application of Race Relations legislation and the legal precedents it has established. This is despite the fact that Jewish minorities in Britain can incorporate Ashkenazi Jews from Poland, Berber Jews from Algeria and African Jews from Ethiopia – all of whom may have different languages, customs and cultures – but are rightly protected against direct discrimination as Jewish minorities. See Meer’s (2008) discussion of a ‘normative grammar’ of race.

6 Indeed, this is the very argument that Muslim bodies deploy when seeking incorporation into Race Equality agendas, and is elsewhere keenly observable in the complaint that ‘Islamophobia’ is not merely anti-religious but that it also constitutes a form of racism. This elaborated further in the main discussion.

7 This is why Walzer (1997: 25) has concluded that nation-state unity is that in which ‘a single dominant group organises the common life in a way that reflects its own authority and culture’. It is equally why Young (1993: 133) has protested that the default position of nation-states necessarily involve the imposition of ‘dominant group related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions [that] will tend to become the norm’.
For example, the Labour MP Bob Marshall-Andrews has argued: ‘...there is a profound difference between race and gender and religion. Our race and our gender are what we are and should be protected. Our religion is what we choose to believe’ (Hansard 21 June 2005, column 676). The Conservative shadow Home Secretary David Davis, meanwhile has stated: ‘Government rightly sought to criminalise people who attempted to stir up hatred on the grounds of race, because race is not something that someone chooses. It is who they are – it is their very person. An attack on race is an attack on the individual. Religious belief is quite different – it is something that someone chooses or, indeed, chooses to opt out of’ (21 June 2005, Hansard column 686). Elsewhere, the Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee has reserved the ‘right’ to affront religious minorities on matters of faith because ‘race is something people cannot choose and it defines nothing about them as people. But beliefs are what people choose to identify with ... The two cannot be blurred into one – which is why the word Islamophobia is a nonsense’ (Toynbee, ‘My right to offend a fool’, The Guardian, 10 June, 2006). Elsewhere she maintain that ‘I am an Islamophobe and proud of it’. (Polly Toynbee, ‘In defence of Islamophobia’, Independent, 23 October 1997.)

According to Rattansi (2007: 5) ‘The term “anti-Semitism” only came into being in the late 1870s, when the German Wilhelm Marr used it to characterize his anti-Jewish movement, the Anti-Semitic League, and he used it specifically to differentiate his project from earlier, more diffuse forms of “Jew hatred”. His was a self-conscious racism that required that Jews be defined as a distinct race. And “anti-Semitism” had the advantage of sounding like a new, scientific concept separate from simple religious bigotry’.

For an excellent discussion of this example see Weaver (2005).

Goldberg (2006: 346) describes a similar characterisation in the following manner: ‘Driven by demagoguery, spurning individuality, spurred on by manic collective excitability. Resisting democracy, persisting in theocracy, giving in to, if not demanding autocracy’.

Modood (2005: 9–10) provides another good illustration of the relationships between biological and cultural racism, as they can map onto religious minorities, when he argues that ‘centuries before those modern ideas we have come to call ‘racism’ ... [t]he move from religious antipathy to racism may perhaps be witnessed in post-Reconquista Spain when Jews and Muslims were forced to convert to Christianity or be expelled’. In delineating the historical confluence of European religious and racial hostility directed toward non-Christian minorities, he maintains that, ‘At this stage, the oppression can perhaps be characterised as religious. Soon afterward, converted Jews and Muslims and their offspring began to be suspected of not being true Christian believers, a doctrine developed amongst some Spaniards that this was because their old religion was in their blood. In short, because of their biology, conversion was impossible. Centuries later, these views about race became quite detached from religion and in Nazi and related doctrines were given a thoroughly scientific-biologic cast and constitute a paradigmatic and extreme version of modern racism. What was once a form of religious persecution became, over a long, complicated, evolving but contingent history, not just a form of cultural racism but one with highly systematic biological formulations’ (ibid).

Sir Moses Haim Montefiore (1784–1885) was president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews for thirty-nine years between 1835–1874. Montefiore was a financier, stockbroker, philanthropist and also the Sheriff of London.

According to the 2001 census data, there are at least 1.6 million people in the United Kingdom who currently describe their religious faith as Islam. This represents 2.9 per cent of the British population, and makes Islam the most populous faith after Christianity (72 per cent); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1 per cent, numbering 559, 000), Sikhism (336, 000), Judaism (267, 000) and Buddhism (152, 000). Of the Muslim constituency, 42.5 percent are of Pakistani origin, 16.8 per cent of Bangladeshi, 8.5 per cent of Indian, and – most interestingly – 7.5 per cent of Other white. This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African ethnic origin who do not define themselves in racial terms. It will also however include East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white Muslims from the New Europe. Black-African (6.2), Other Asian (5.8) and British (4.1) dominate the remaining
categories of ethnic identification in the census options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable – if inaccurate – that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost with a South Asian background, since Muslims with such a background make up roughly 68 per cent of the British Muslim population. It is also worth noting that according to the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (2005) the census significantly underestimates the Muslim presence in Britain, a figure they put at 2,500,000 to 3,000,000, with a projection of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 by 2013. See the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (2005) Islam in Britain: The British Muslim Community in February 2005 (Pewsey, UK: Isaac).

15 Inaugurated in 1997, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is an umbrella organisation made up of over 400 local, regional and national organisations. Its aims include the promotion of consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK; giving voice to issues of common concern; addressing discriminations and disadvantages faced by Muslims in Britain; encouraging ‘a more enlightened appreciation’ of Islam and Muslims in the wider society; and working for ‘the good of society as a whole’. With a view to representing British Muslims, it lobbies government and holds discussions with various public bodies and is in many respects modelled on the Board of Deputies of British Jews. For a good history and analysis of the MCB see Birt (2005).

16 Thus supporting Rattansi’s (2007) argument that racialization need not always make its subject inferior.


18 Shabina Begum was a High School pupil who claimed that she was required by her Muslim faith to wear a jilbab (a full length gown). The school viewed this as a contravention of its uniform policy and excluded Begum until she wore the official uniform. In response Begum issued a claim for a judicial review of the school’s decision on the grounds that the school had interfered with her right to manifest her religion and her right to education (both rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights). The school responded that after Begum’s parents had died, she had come under the undue influence of her brother, a supporter of the Islamist organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir. More substantively, they claimed that if Begum was allowed to attend classes wearing a jilbab, other pupils would feel under undue pressure to adopt stricter forms of Islamic dress. Begum lost the case in the High Court, but successfully overturned this in the Court of Appeal. In 2006 the case was heard by the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords which eventually ruled in favour of the school. See R (On the Application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (Judgment of 22 March 2006 available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060322/begum-4.htm).

19 See http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/reward-52-details/reward-detail.do (accessed on 19 November, 2007).

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