thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives
THE RACIALISATION OF MUSLIMS

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Conditions for Muslims in Europe must be made harder across the board: Europe must look like a less attractive proposition. And of course it should go without saying that Muslims in Europe who for any reason take part in, plot, assist or condone violence against the West (not just the country they happen to have found sanctuary in, but any country in the West or Western troops) must be forcibly deported back to their place of origin... Where a person was born in the West, they should be deported to the country of origin of their parent or grandparent.

Douglas Murray, Director of the Centre for Social Cohesion, Civitas

It has been argued that there are currently two dynamics shaping hostile attitudes toward Muslims in Europe. The source of the first is located squarely in contemporary agendas of counter-terrorism (and associated anxieties that may fuel a securitisation of ethnic relations more broadly). The second, it is argued, has been inherited from an ideological-historical relationship with the Orient, one that is intertwined with legacies of imperialism (Geisser, 2005). Neither dynamic is discrete and both can be seen to overlap in the public discourses of a variety of European political discourse. Amongst these we might include statements by the Austrian Freedom Party on the prospect of Turkey's accession to the EU, the Flemish Block's insistence that 'Islam is now the no. 1 enemy not only of Europe but of the world' (see also Fadil, this volume),
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French National Front literature on the 'Islamisation of France' (quoted in Bunzl, 2007, pp. 1–47), as well as the way in which the Swiss People's Party has recently sought office with electoral posters depicting veiled Muslim women under the question: 'Where are we living, Baden or Baghdad?' (Spritzer, 2009). Parallels can also be found in the leading, but much less mainstream, far-right British National Party (BNP), which frequently campaigns on what it describes as 'the Muslim problem' (see Meer, 2007, pp. 112–116). These macro-political sentiments coalesce with the findings of some European attitude surveys which report the worrying trend that more than half of a representative sample of Spaniards and Germans state that they 'do not like' Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008). In Poland and France, meanwhile, the number of people holding unfavourable opinions of Muslims is reportedly 46 per cent and 38 per cent respectively, against which it is perhaps some comfort that 'only' one in four Britons expresses attitudinal hostility to Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008). In his meta-study of British opinion polling, Field has confirmed this trend and characterised the prevalence of negative perceptions of British Muslims as an increase in Islamophobia (Field, 2007, pp. 447–477).

Whilst such findings perhaps reflect a social and political climate marked by various 'crises' involving Muslims, Field nevertheless draws our attention to the need to unpack conceptual issues surrounding this term (Field, 2007, pp. 447–477). For as the opening extract from Douglas Murray betrays, there appear to be several components in contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment, which is a concept of Islamophobia should seek to capture. For example, in his prescription for 'dealing with Muslims', Murray relies upon an essential idea of Europe that is closed to Muslims, and where, concomitantly, Muslims' civil and political rights are less meaningful, while their ethnic origins serve as important means of ascertaining where they really belong. His anti-Muslim sentiment, therefore, simultaneously draws upon signs of race, culture and belonging in a way that is by no means reducible to hostility toward a religion alone, and compels us to consider how religion has a new sociological relevance because of the ways it is tied up with issues of community identity, stereotyping, socio-economic location, political conflict and so forth.

On the one hand, and especially given that religious discrimination in most Western societies does not usually proceed on the basis of belief but perceived membership of an ethno-religious group (e.g. Catholics in Northern Ireland, Muslims in the countries of former Yugoslavia, and Jews in general), Murray's account is consistent with an established tendency of targeting religious groups and communities as opposed to beliefs and opposition to beliefs. For as his extract illustrates, this phenomena need not be pure 'religious discrimination' but one which also traffics in stereotypes about foreignness, phenotypes and culture. As such there are obvious similarities between forms of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment that remain under explored (Meer and Noorani, 2008, pp. 195–219) but which may herald important differences as well as similarities (Bunzl, 2007, pp. 1–47). Of course how Muslims respond to these circumstances will vary. Some will organise resistance, while others will try to stop looking like Muslims (the equivalent of 'passing' for white); some will build an ideology out of their subordination, others will not, just as a woman can choose to be a feminist or not. Again, some Muslims may define their Islam in terms of piety rather than politics; just as some women may see no politics in their gender, while for others their gender will be at the centre of their politics.

The question that is nevertheless posed for any contemporary concept of Islamophobia is whether it can, amongst other things, (i) analytically capture the contingent racial and cultural dynamics of the macro-historical juxtaposition between 'Europe' and 'Islam'; (ii) sufficiently delineate the racialising component of polemics such as Murray's, from a potentially sedate critique of Islam as a religion; and (iii) more broadly summon enough explanatory power to stipulate how long established organising concepts within the study of race and racism may, in some Hegelian fashion, be developed and formulated in a sociologically convincing manner. This raises the broader point of how it is striking to note the virtual absence of an established literature on race and racism in the discussion on Islamophobia. This chapter makes a tentative contri-

1 For examples of less flagrant, more coded, but equally alarming comments made by British politicians and intellectuals, see Meer (2006, 2008), and Meer and Noorani (2008).
bution to overcoming this disconnection by exploring what purchase the ideas of ‘racialisation’ and ‘cultural racism’ can bring to bare on the conceptualisation of these matters. To examine the entanglements between race and religion as they apply to Muslims, the first part of the chapter explores the theoretical and normative issues raised by these questions, while the second half discusses the reaction from intellectuals to the novelists Martin Amis’s controversial comments about Muslims as a means to apply the preceding discussion and evaluate the explanatory power of Islamophobia.

Conceiving Islamophobia

The origins of the term Islamophobia have been variously traced to a pair of critiques of Orientalist scholarship published by Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim in 1918 and 1922 (see Vakil, this volume), ‘a neologism of the 1970s’ (Rana, 2007, p. 148), an early nineteen nineties American periodical (Sheridan, 2006, pp. 317–336), and, indeed, to one of the present authors (Birt, 2006a). What is less disputed is that the term received its public policy prominence with the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBM1). Islamophobia: A challenge for us all (Runnymede Trust, 1997a). Defined as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997a, p. 4), the report conceived of eight argumentative positions to encapsulate its meaning, and through which the members of the commission sought to draw attention to their assessment that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997a, p. 4). This, of course, was before global events had elevated the issue to a prominence previously only hinted at, and which resulted in a second sitting of the commission which heard testimonies from leading Muslim spokespeople (in this instance, Baroness Uddin) of how ‘there is not a day that we do not have to face comments so ignorant that even Enoch Powell would not have made them’ (quoted in Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia [CBMI], 2004, p. 3).

What the commission perhaps did not fully anticipate was how the term would be criticised from several quarters for, amongst other things, allegedly reinforcing ‘a monolithic concept of Islam, Islamic cultures, Muslims and Islamism, involving ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical and doctrinal differences while affording vocal Muslims a ready concept of victimology’ (Ozanne, 2006, p. 28; Afrohar, Aitken and Myfanwy, 2005). To others the term has neglected ‘the active and aggressive part of discrimination’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 6) by conceiving discrimination as a collection of pathological beliefs, inferred through the language of ‘-phobias’; with the additional complaint that the term does not adequately account for the nature of the prejudice directed at Muslims. This complaint is advanced in Halliday’s thesis and is worth examining because Halliday accepts that Muslims experience direct discrimination as Muslims. He nevertheless considers Islamophobia misleading because:

It misses the point about what it is that it being attacked: ‘Islam’ as a religion was the enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now [...] The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term (Halliday, 1999, p. 898, original emphasis).

So in contrast to the thrust of the Islamophobia concept, as he understands it, the stereotypical enemy is not a faith or a culture, but a people who form the ‘real’ targets of prejudice. Halliday’s critique is richer than many others, particularly more journalistic accounts (a good illustration of which can be found in Malik, 2005). What it appears to ignore, however, is how the
majority of Muslims who report experiencing street level discrimination recount—as testimonies to the 2004 Runneymede follow-up commission (CBMIL, 2004) bear witness—that they do so more when they appear 'conspicuously Muslim' than when they do not. Since this can result from wearing Islamic attire it becomes irrelevant—if it is even possible—to separate the impact of appearing Muslim from the impact of appearing to follow Islam. For example, the increase in everyday personal abuse since 9/11 and 7/7 in which the perceived 'Islamicness' of the victims is the central reason for abuse, regardless of the validity of this presumption (resulting in Sikhs and others with an 'Arab' appearance being attacked), suggests that discrimination and/or hostility to Islam and Muslims is much more interlinked than Halliday's thesis allows (and, in all fairness to Halliday, may not easily have been anticipated at his time of writing). In contrast we contend that, instead of trying to neatly delineate social tendencies that are inextricably linked; they should instead be understood as a composite of 'racialisation'. This requires some elaboration.

_Muslims and Racialisation_

The idea of racialisation boasts a long pedigree even if the term itself does not, and although it was perhaps first encountered in British sociology through the work of Michael Banton, arguably in his *Race Relations* (Banton, 1967), it was Robert Miles (1982; 1984; 1986; 1988; 1989; 1993) who for a long time offered its most sustained exposition. Reminiscent of a Du Boisian tradition in which the psychic and the social are intertwined, Miles' conception of racialisation (Miles, 1989, p. 75) sought to capture the ways in which racial processes can attribute 'meaning to somatic characteristics' in a way that presumes a social psychological theory which explains the nature and dynamics of the process' (Miles, 1989, p. 75). As a Marxist, of course, Miles anchored his conception of racialisation in an account of material relations and an ideologically driven conflict borne of the contradictory impulses inherent to circumscribed nationhood and labour migration (Miles, 1982, pp. 170–173). What is important for our discussion, however, is that Miles never insisted that processes of racialisation must be premised upon a 'biological inheritence' (an issue elaborated below) and which informed his resolve that scholars 'must not restrict the application of the concept of racialisation to situations where people distinguish one another by reference to skin colour' (Miles, 1982, pp. 170–173; see also the discussion of Miles in Modood, 1996). More specifically, what he maintained that we should be studying instead are the ways in which 'signifying processes' interact to 'construct differentiated social collectives as races' (Miles, 1989, p. 79).

To facilitate such inquiry, and because he recognised that the social dynamics of racism can in practice be mixed-up with a host of different kinds of 'isms', such as nationalism, ethnicism and sexism and so forth, Miles (1989, p. 87) put forward a conceptualisation of 'racial articulations': He did so to preserve the analytical clarity of racism while recognising that in social life exclusionary discourses and prejudices are rarely discrete and, to the contrary, frequently overlap in 'sharing a common content or generalised object which allows them to be joined together or interrelated, to be expressed in ways in which elements of one are incorporated in the other' (Miles, 1989, p. 87). This is an astute conceptualisation and a good contemporary illustration of its explanatory purchase may be found in the summary report on Islamophobia published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia shortly after 9/11. This identified a rise in the number of 'physical and verbal threats being made, particularly to those visually identifiable as Muslims, in

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3 See also Grossberg's (1993, p. 31) idea of how racial articulations can contain 'a multiplicity of ways in which different meanings, experiences, powers, interests, and identities can be articulated together'.
particular, women wearing the hijab’ (Allen and Nielsen, 2002, p. 16). What is of particular note is that despite variations in the number and correlation of physical and verbal threats directed at Muslim populations among the individual nation-states, one overarching feature that emerged among the fifteen European Union countries was the tendency for Muslim women to be attacked because of how the hijab signifies a gendered Islamic identity (Allen and Nielsen, 2002, p. 35). Indeed, and to return to the earlier point concerning the distinction between antipathy toward Muslims and antipathy toward those appearing to follow Islam, these overlapping and interacting ‘articulations’ of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice can also be illustrated further in the attitude polling of non-Muslim Britons one year after 9/11. This showed that:

...there could be little doubt from G-2002e [31 October – 1 November, YouGov, n=1,890; The Guardian, 5 November 2002; http://www.YouGov.com] that 9/11 had taken some toll. Views of Islam since 9/11 were more negative for 47%, and of Britain’s Muslims for 35% (almost three times the first post-9/11 figure in G-2001f [8-10 October, NOP, n=600; Daily Telegraph, 12 October 2001]). [...] Dislike for Islam was expressed by 36%, three in four of whom were fearful of what it might do in the next few years. One quarter rejected the suggestion that Islam was mainly a peaceful religion, with terrorists comprising only a tiny minority... (Field, 2007, p. 455).

If these examples and the preceding discussion begin to make manifest a number of confusions contained within contemporary references to racial and religious antipathy toward Muslims and Islam, then—as debates concerning racism and other religious minorities, not least with respect to anti-Semitism, betray (Meer and Noorani, 2008, pp. 195–219)—this is not uniquely problematic in the conceptualisation of anti-Muslim sentiment.

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More precisely, the interactions between racial and religious antipathy can be helpfully drawn out through Modood’s description of anti-Semitism as ‘a form of [ethno]-religious persecution [which] became, over a long, complicated, evolving but contingent history, not just a form of cultural racism but one with highly systematic biological formulations’ (Modood, 2005, pp. 9–10). This should not be read as an endorsement of the view that all racism can be reduced to biological inferences. Indeed, in the example above, modern biological racism has some roots in pre-modern religious antipathy—an argument that is supported by Rana (Rana, 2007, pp. 148–162). Moreover,

while racism in modern Europe took a biologicist form, what is critical to racialisation of a group is not the invocation of a biology but a radical ‘otherness’ and the perception and treatment of individuals in terms of physical appearance and descent. The implication is that non-Christian religious minorities in Europe can undergo processes of racialisation where the ‘otherness’ or ‘groupness’ that is appealed to is connected to a cultural and racial otherness which relates to European peoples’ historical and contemporary perceptions of those people that they perceive to be non-European (Goldberg, 2006). This means that how Muslims in Europe are perceived today is not un-connected to how they have been perceived and treated by European empires and their racial hierarchies in earlier centuries (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). This is because their perception and treatment clearly has a religious and cultural dimension but, equally clearly, bears a phenotypical component. For while it is true that ‘Muslim’ is not a (putative) biological category in the way that ‘black’ or ‘south Asian’ (aka ‘Paki’), or Chinese is, neither was ‘Jew’. In that instance it took a long non-linear history of racialisation to turn an ethnic-religious group into a race.6 More precisely, the latter did not so much replace the former as superimposed itself because even though no one denied that Jews were a religious community, with a distinctive language(s), culture(s) and religion, Jews still came to be seen as a race, and with horrific consequences.

As Bunzl maintains, ‘the move from Judenhass (Jew hatred) to anti-Semitism marks a crucial turning point of the late nineteenth century. It was understood both by contemporaries and later observers as marking a momentous transformation, characterized by the rise of an organized political movement as well as a shift in alterity from religion to race’ (Bunzl, 2005, p. 537). Similarly, Bosnian Muslims were ‘ethnically cleansed’ because they came to be identified as a ‘racial’ group by people who were phenotypically, linguistically and culturally the same as themselves. The ethnic cleanser, unlike an Inquisitor, wasted no time in finding out what people believed, if and how often they went to a mosque and so on: their victims were racially identified as Muslims (Modood, 2006, pp. 51–62).

6 See the case study of Incitement to Religious Hatred legislation in Meer (2008), and Modood’s rejoinder in his discussion of the Danish Cartoon affair in Modood (2006).
Biological and Cultural Racism

Race is not just about biology or even ‘colour’; while racialisation has to pick on some features of a person related to physical appearance and ancestry (otherwise racism cannot be distinguished from other forms of ‘groupism’) it need only be a marker, and not necessarily denote a form of determinism. This is illustrated in the conceptualisation of cultural racism as a two-step process (Modood, 1997). While biological racism is the antipathy, exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their physical appearance or other imputed physical differences, saliently in Britain their non-‘whiteness’, cultural racism builds on biological racism a further discourse which evokes cultural differences from an alleged British, ‘civilised’ norm to vilify, marginalise or demand cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer from biological racism. Post-war racism in Britain has been simultaneously culturalist and biological, and while the latter is essential to the racism in question, it is, in fact, the less explanatory aspect of a complex phenomenon. Biological interpretations have not governed what white British people, including racists, have thought or done; how they have stereotyped, treated and related to non-whites; and biological ideas have had increasingly less force both in the context of personal relationships and in the conceptualisation of groups. As white people’s interactions with non-white individuals increased, they did not become necessarily less conscious of group differences but they were far more likely to ascribe group differences to upbringing, customs, forms of socialisation and self-identity than to biological heredity. The interesting question arises as to whether it could be one-step racism: could colour racism decline and fade away and yet cultural racism remain and perhaps even grow?

One can certainly imagine a future in which a group could continue to have their culture vilified while colour racism simultaneously declined, and the distinction between what might be called racism proper and ‘culturalism’ is commonly held and continues to be argued for (Blum, 2002; Fredrickson, 2002). Yet while it appears that to discriminate only against those perceived to be culturally different might be borderline racial discrimination, where cultural essentialism and inferiorisation may be involved it would certainly share some of the qualities of what we know of racist stereotyping and practise today. Even then, however, it may still be regarded as a cultural prejudice or cultural exclusionism rather than racism per se, so that if persons are targeted only on the basis of their behaviour and not on the basis of their ancestry, then might we not have something we should call culturalism rather than racism?

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While this is an interesting question it appears to go against what we should expect from communities and social dynamics, since cultures and cultural practices are usually internally diverse, containing and omitting various ‘authentic’ elements, and adaptations and mixes. It follows then that the culturalised targeting could very easily be expansive, rather than purist, and so in one way or another catches most if not all cultural minorities in that group. For example, a non-religious Muslim might still be targeted as a cultural Muslim or Muslim by community, which means Muslim by background, which means birth and ancestry. Hence it is not clear that culturalism, where it is associated with distinct communities, can really be distinguished from racism in practice, even if it can be in theory. But if we accept that racism does not necessarily involve attributing qualities that inhere in a deterministic law-like way in all members of a group, then we do not have to rule out cultural racism as an example of racism. This means that cultural racism is not merely a proxy for racism (Barker, 1981; Gilroy, 1987; Solomos, 1991) but a form of racism itself, and that while racism involves some reference to physical appearance or ancestry it does not require any form of biological determinism, only a physical identification on a group basis, attributable to descent. As such we should guard against the characterisation of racism as a form of ‘inherentism’ or ‘biological determinism’, which leaves little space to conceive the ways in which cultural racism draws upon physical appearance as one marker, amongst others. As such, we maintain that formulations of racialisation should not be solely premised upon conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and the like (cf. Miles, 1989).

Permissible Discourse on Muslims

We proceed with the view that terms such as anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia, as well as indeed anti-Semitism, should nest in conceptions of racialisation and cultural racism. This is not least because neat and categorical delineations within terminology are made implausible by variations in the social phenomena that they seek to describe and understand, so that a more nimble and absorbent nomenclature is preferred. These theoretical concerns can be applied to the reaction to comments about Muslims made during an interview with the Sunday Times in September 2006 by the celebrated British novelist Martin Amis:

They’re also gaining on us demographically at a huge rate. A quarter of humanity now and by 2025 they’ll be a third. Italy’s down to 1.1 child per woman. We’re just going
to be outnumbered... There's a definite urge—don't you have it?—to say, 'The Muslim community will have to suffer until it gets its house in order.' What sort of suffering? Not letting them travel. Deportation—further down the road. Curtailing of freedoms. Strip-searching people who look like they're from the Middle East or from Pakistan. Discriminatory stuff, until it hurts the whole community and they start getting tough with their children (quoted in Dougherty, 2006).

When the tenor of these comments is coupled with Amis's notoriety, it is perhaps surprising to learn that they went largely unnoticed until a year later when Terry Eagleton (2007) criticised them in the preface to a revised edition of his book Ideology: An Introduction. This prompted a robust defence from Amis himself who characterised his comments as an experiment in the limits of permissible thought or 'adumbrations', and which in turn invited separate but overlapping charges from the film-maker Ronan Bennett (2007) the journalists Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2007) and Peter Wilby (2007) the satirist Chris Morris (2007) and the novelist Pankaj Mishra (2007) that Amis was sanctioning a form of racism.

Taken together, the objections to Amis derived, firstly, from his attribution to all Muslims of pejorative group characteristics; specifically an irrational desire for violence. Secondly, the perpetuation of fears concerning a demographic challenge posed by Muslims to 'native' (non-Muslim) European populations. Thirdly, the championing of discriminatory surveillance of people who 'appear' Muslim—strip-searching people who look like they're from the Middle East or from Pakistan—on the grounds that there is an essential Muslim appearance and that it correlates with the risk of terrorism. Fourthly, that Amis was advocating a form of collective punishment according to which all Muslims must bear responsibility for the actions of the few.

Despite these clusters of criticisms, Amis nevertheless received strong support from several leading intellectuals who endorsed his anxieties, if not his exact framing. Indeed, even The Guardian ran a leader entitled: 'In Praise of... Martin Amis' stating that while 'his writing on Islamist terrorism has made him enemies...we should prize him—for his engagement as well as his gifts' (Guardian Leader, 2008). The Independent (2007), meanwhile, applauded his 'right to stand up for the right, in a culture of free speech, to think aloud'. These examples appear to confirm Bennett's (2007) conclusion that:

Amis's remarks, his defence of them, and the reaction to them were a test... we failed that test. Amis got away with it. He got away with such obvious an outburst of racist sentiment as any public figure has made in this country for a very long time. Shame on him for saying it, and shame on us for tolerating it.
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The defence of Amis draws our attention to a new front of entanglements between race, religion, and politics, one which is hitherto subject to sufficient ambiguity so as to further license the attribution to all Muslims of pejorative group characteristics; specifically an irrational desire for violence. For example, Amis himself has insisted that while we ought to ‘respect’ Islam as ‘the donor of countless benefits to mankind, and the possessor of a thrilling history... we do not respect Islamism’ (Amis, 2008, p. 50). In so far as it assumes that there is no relationship between the psychic and the social, or that an individually held identity can be de-coupled from the way in which that identity is referred to and represented at a more societal or macro level, Amis’ distinction is a permutation of the insistence that we can freely choose to live within discrete identity boundaries. Or as Kundnani puts it: ‘a great deal hangs on the three letters separating Islam from Islamism and the two can easily be conflated or linked together structurally’ (Kundnani, 2008, p. 43). This was already much in evidence with Amis’ conflation of ‘the Islamists’ with ‘the Muslims’ during his insistence that ‘they are gaining on us demographically’ (as discussed above). It is perhaps unsurprising therefore to hear him maintain: ‘No doubt the impulse towards rational inquiry is by now very weak in the rank and file of the Muslim male’ (Amis, 2008, p. 89). It would require some stretch of the imagination to conceive this as a principled contestation of a social or political discourse, instead of a rehearsal of the types of syntheses between race and culture that are projected upon and intertwined with religion. So just as our discussion of Douglas Murray compels us to seek a terminology that can simultaneously explain the reliance upon signs of race, culture and belonging, in a way that is by no means reducible to hostility to a religion alone, so our discussion of Amis and newer racialised cleavages surrounding Islamism requires us to pursue the same.

In this chapter we have tried to show how anti-Muslim sentiment simultaneously draws upon signs of race, culture and belonging in a way that compels us to consider how religion has a new sociological relevance because of the ways it is tied up with issues of community identity, stereotyping, socio-economic location, political conflict and so forth. The sociology of race and racism possesses a powerful repertoire of explanatory concepts to address this topic that makes it all the more striking to find so little by way of application. Chief amongst the concepts we identify are those of racialisation and cultural racism, for these can explain how religious discrimination in most Western societies does not usually proceed on the basis of belief but perceived membership of an ethno-religious group. We have argued that the arithmetic of Islamophobia, like anti-Semitism, shares much with this formula in a way that is strikingly illustrated in Martin Amis’ characterisation of Muslims. Amis employs a form of cultural racism which trades on pejorative characterisations of religious groups and communities, as opposed to beliefs and opposition to beliefs, and so it is not a pure ‘religious discrimination’ but one which traffics in stereotypes about foreignness, phenotypes and culture. We therefore maintain that concepts of Islamophobia must draw analytical weight from those of racialisation and cultural racism.